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CHAPTER 1. INfRODUcrrON

Since the early 1970's, the problems posed by diminishing natural resources,
mounting waste, and increased pollution of air and water have gained public attention.
Federal, state and local legislators have responded to the growing public awareness
toward environmental problems by enacting a comprehensive net of protective
environmental regulations. In many instances, the United States today has the most
stringent environmental laws of all industrialized nations and certainly has the reputation
for the most draconian enforcement of these laws.

1

However, widespread non-compliance by private polluters and non-enforcement by
government authorities exists.2 To a large extent, this lack of compliance and
enforcement is an information problem. After the consciousness-raising
3

1970's and 1980's,

decades of the

most companies are nowadays aware of the requirements

environmental law imposes on how they have to conduct their respective businesses.
Despite this knowledge of the legal standards, however, management, as well as the
responsible government authorities, often do not know when conduct violating these
standards occurs.

1) See Lorelei Joy Borland, Environmental Compliance is Good Business, in BASICSOF
ENVIRONMENTALLAW 1993, at 19,21 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Handbook Series
No. H-459, 1993).
2) For example, in 1988, although the majority of cases are settled, the EP A initiated 225
administrative actions and 9 criminal prosecution actions against violators, see 19 ENVTL.
RPT. 1762 (BNA) (Current Developments) (1988)
3) See Borland, supra note 1, at 22-27.

1

2
reporting of violations by employees has, as examples from other areas show 4, the
,

potential to dramatically increase compliance with and enforcement of environmental law.
Within the last 25 years, courts and legislators have developed a variety of approaches
to deal with the legal problems posed by employees who report alleged or true
wrongdoing of their employers. In balancing the interests of the employer in the loyalty
and obedience of its workforce and the conflicting interest of the employee-citizen in law
enforcement and compliance,5 a body of "whistleblowing,,61aw has gradually evolved,
which forms, in ;the eyes of many employment lawyers, the "hottest niche of their practice
today. ,,7
This article argues that in order to further environmental protection, a uniform state
statute encouraging employees to report perceived violations of environmental law
externally to government authorities should be adopted and outlines the content of such a
statute.
Chapter I, after defining the scope of the article, examines the extent of the existing
legal protection of such "environmental" whistleblowing, as well as legal disincentives to
blow the whistle. Chapter 2 shows that, by balancing the interests involved, encouraging
external whistleblowing should be the goal of whistleblower regulation. It then examines

4) See Chad A. Atkins, The Whistleblower Exception to the At-Will Employment
Doctrine: An Economic Analysis of Environmental Policy Enforcement, 70

DENY.U.L.REV. 537, 538n1O (1993).
5) Compare Nicholas R. Rongine, Toward A Coherent Legal Response To The Public
Policy Dilemma Posed By Whistleblowing, 23 AM. BUS.L.J. 281, 284-86 (1985);
DANIELP. WESTMAN,WmS1LEBLOWING71 (1991).
6) The term "whistleblower" stems either from an anlogy to an official in sports, such as
a football referee, who can blow a whistle to stop action, see MARCIAP. MICELI &
JANETP. NEAR, BLOWINGTHEWmS1LE 15 (1992); ALAN F. WESTIN,
WmS1LEBLOWING!LoYALTYANDDISSENTIN THECORPORATION1 (Alan F. Westin
ed., 1981), or from the act of an English bobby who blows his whistle to alert other law
enforcement officers of the commission of a crime, see Vanessa F. Kuhlmann-Macro,
Blowing The Whistle On The Employment At-will Doctrine, 41 DRAKE L.REv. 339 N7
(1992); Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723,727 (Texas
1990).
7) See Gary Taylor, Blowing Whistles. Spilling Beans In The Private Sector Is Now A
Big Legal Business, NAT'L. L.J., Sept. 20, 1993, at co!. 1.

3
the possible ways to encourage such reporting through law, the receptiveness of
whistleblowing to legal regulation, and outlines the parameters of a model whistleblower
statute.

CHAPTER 2. ENVIRONMENTAL wmSTI..EBLOWING:

THE SCOPE OF THE

THESIS

I. wmSTI..EBLOWING

DEFINED

Although dis~greement in detail exists, whistleblowing is generally defmed as the "(I)
disclosure (2) of wrongdoing (3) under the control of the organization (4) by a former or
current member of that organization (5) to a person or organization that may be able to
effect action. ,,8
Generally, not only disclosure by actively volunteering information (active
9

whistleblowing),

but also the response to a lawful request for information from

government authorites (passive whistleblowing), is covered. 10 Moreover, usually the
refusal to obey orders to commit wrongdoing is considered passive whistieblowing.11
The refusal may be viewed as a complaint to the person giving the order that the employee
perceives the ordered behavior as wrongdoing.

8) See e.g. Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 15-21; Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P.
Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are they working?, 25 AM.BuS.L.J. 243-244 (1987);
Westman, supra note 5, at 19-20; FREDERICKELLISTONET. AL., WHISTLEBLOWING
RESEARCH 4-24 (1984).
9) Westman, supra note 5, at 19-20; Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 16; Dworkin &
Near, supra note 8, at 244 ("good faith reporting"); Elliston, supra note 8, at 5-6.
10) Westman, supra note 5, at 19-20 also includes "embryonic whistleblowing," i.e.
preventive retaliation against a whistleblower before he has opportunity to disclose.
11) ld.; see Gary R. Siniscalo, Wrongful Termination and Emerging Torts, in 21st
Annual Institute on Employment Law, (PLl Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. H4-5137, 1992), available in Westlaw No. 92 LllLit 379.

4

5
Whether an activity or omission 12 constitutes "wrongdoing" is not judged by an
objective standa!d but is determined by the perception of the individual whistleblower.13
Generally, the whistleblower must perceive the act either as illegal or as "illegitimate",
"immoral", "unethical" or just "beyond the purview of what an organization legitimately
can expect an employee to do.,,14 The distinctions between the latter characterizations
appear to be more semantic than substantive. 15 As to illegal behavior, there seems to be
consensus that it covers "any act punishable by the state, regardless whether it is
punished by acrnpnstrative or civil law or criminallaw.,,16
The requirement of wrongdoing "under the control of the organization" covers any
wrongdoing occuring in the organization, be it on behalf of the organization or on behalf
of the wrongdoer. 17 Authorization or knowledge of supervisors or top management is
not necessary.

18

Finally, only former or current members of the organization can be whistleblowers,19
including members whose job ostensibly requires them to report wrongdoing20 and
excluding, e.g., independent contractors.21 However, considerable controversy exists
about who may be the recipient of the disclosure. There is consensus that reports to

12) Both activities and omissions can constitue wrongdoing, see Miceli & Near, supra
note 6, at 18. The term "act" in the following also encompasses omissions.
13) Id. at 18-19; Dworkin & Near, supra note 8, at 244; see Hausermann, WhistleBlowing: Individual Morality in a Corporate Society, 29 Bus.HORIZONS 1,4 (1986);
Westman, supra note 5, at 19
14) Dworkin & Near, supra note 8, at 244; Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 17-18;
Rongione, supra note 5, at 284; Westin, supra note 6, at 9; Elliston, supra note 8, at 13.
15) See, e.g., Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 17 (defining illegitimate as "beyond the
realm of the organization's authority").
16) M.B. CLINARD, CORPORATEETHICSAND CRIME: THE ROLE OF MIDDLE
MANAGEMENT 10 (1983); Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 17.
17) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 19-20; Dworkin & Near, supra note 8, at 243.
18) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 19-20; Dworkin & Near, supra note 8, at 243.
19) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 16-17 ("general agreement among theorists");
Dworkin & Near, supra note 8, at 243 ("generally agreed"); Elliston, supra note 8, at 14.
20) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 21.
21) See Lois A. Lofgren, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and the Courts

Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the Wron!?doing
of Employers?, 38 S.D.L.REV. 329 (1993) ..
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parties outside the organization constitute whistleblowing. However, opinions are split as
22

to whether reports to internal recipients are covered.

Empirically, whistleblowers who

use internal channels do not significantly differ from external whistleblowers. Therefore,
and because of the fact that internal complaints are very often lodged prior to external
whistleblowing,z3 the majority rightly includes both categories under the definition.24
As whistleblowers characteristically "lack authority and power to make the changes being
sought (and) therefore must appeal to someone of greater power or authority,,,25 there is
no need to restri~t it to outside parties.

n. ENVIRONMENTAL

WHISTLEBLOWING

For the purpose of this article, a restriction to private sector "environmental
whistleblowing," i.e. the active disclosure of violations of environmental laws, either
internally or externally to government authorities, seems appropriate.
Active whistleblowing is the form of reporting the least influenced by legal regulation
outside existing whistleblower law. Therefore, it seems to be best suited to show the
basic problems of environmental whistleblowing. Other than active whistleblowing,
passive whistleblowing is subject to various legal incentives to report. As it is the reaction
to either an information request by government or an order by the employer to perform an
unlawful act, reporting is not the product of a free decision but is forced to a large degree
by legal rules. Information requests by government, for example a subpoena, are
governed by discovery and administrative law and may impose a duty to testify26 The

22) See cit. at Elliston, supra note 8, at 4,9-10; Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 25.
23) See Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 26-27.
24) Dworkin & Near, supra note 8, at 243; Westman, supra note 5, at 19-20; Miceli &
Near, supra note 6, at 25-27.
25) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 15; compare Westin, supra note 5, at 1-2.
26) See FED.R.Crv.P. 45; FED.R.CRrM.P. 17.
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decision whether to refuse to perform an unlawful act may be heavily influenced by
concerns of personal criminal or civil liability when following the order.27
The restriction to violations of environmental law, rather than immoral or unethical
behavior, reflects the prerogative of the legislative to defme what constitutes legally
recognized wrongdoing in our society.
As internal and external whistle blowing usually go hand in hand and pose similar
problems, both are covered. The limitation of external complaints to government
authorities reflects government's primary responsibility to enforce compliance with

, 28

environmental law.

Finally, the analysis is limited to private sector employees. Private industry has by far
the highest share in the number of activities potentially dangerous for the environment,
has to make profits in order to survive in the market, which may further unlawful
behavior, and lacks control mechanisms available in public sector enterprises.

27) Compare Daniel Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and the Regulation of the Environment,
in ENVIRONMENTALLAW 1993, at 519, 546-548 (ALl-ABA Course of Study 1993).
28) Environmental laws are also "enforced" by civil actions of individuals, such as
neighbors or injured parties. However, although there may be some overlap, the goal of
these actions are not the protection of the environment, but individual damages.

CHAPIER 3. A SURVEY OF ENVIRONMENTAL WHISTI..EBLOWING LAW
American employment law provides for a specific body of whislleblower protection
law. In addition, environmental whislleblowing is governed by the general principles of
law.

I. ENVIRONMENTAL WHISTI..EBLOWER PROlECITON

LAW

A. 1HE EMPLOYMENT AT-WiLL DOCTRINE
In the United States, the employment relationship of roughly three quarters of the
29

private sector workforce

is based on the employment at-will doctrine. Developed in the

middle of last century, 30 this doctrine permits an employer to terminate an employee "for
good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong without being thereby guilty
of legal wrong.,,31 Although substantially modified and eroded in the last twenty
years,32 the free severability of the employment relationship by both the employer and
the employee is still the basic underlying assumption in American employment law.33

29) See U.S. BUteau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 1982-83, tables 500, 683, 624; Kevin D. Hill, Whistleblower: A Study of
Alternative Remedies, 4 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 50n3 1985); the remainder are
employed either under personal contracts or covered by a collective bargaining agreement,
id.
30) For the history of the doctrine see Hill, supra note 29, at 51-52; Atkins, supra note 4,
at 540-541.
31) See Payne v. Western & All. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507 (S. Ct. Tenn. 1884); Tameney
v. All. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
32) See Frank J. Cavico, Employment at Will and Public Policy, 25 AKRON L.REv. 497
(1992).
33) Most states apply a presumption for at-will employment, which is in some states
statutory, see, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE Sec. 2922; GA. CODE ANN. Sec. 34-71; N.D.
CENT. CODE Sec. 34-03-01; Siniscalo, supra note 11, at 7.
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B. LEGAL PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL wmSTLEBLOWING
In light of the in principle unrestricted right to discharge an employee, the
whistleblowing discussion focuses mainly on legal protection against retaliation by the
employer. Such protection is available both on the federal and the state level.
On the federal level, a large number of statutes protect public or private whistleblowers
today.34 The protection of private sector whistleblowers in several "environmental"
statutes overlaps substantially with other federal statutes protecting the public35 or
workplace safety and health.36
On the state level, the courts reacted to the problem of whistleblowing by creating
common law remedies against retaliation on a step-by-step basis.37 Although frequently
courts rely on contract theories or construe a covenant of good faith and fair dealing to
protect whistleblowers,38 the by far most important remedy39 is a tort action based on
public policy considerations. As common law remedies evolved slowly and
incoherently,40 several states enacted - in addition to a few scattered and limited existing
..
41 - gene ral w h'IS tl ebl ower statutes protectmg
.. pnvate sector emp Ioyees. 42
provIsions

34) See compilation at Westman, supra note 5, Appendix C.; Lofgren, supra note 21, at
321 n.41.
35) See, e.g., Fed. Railroad Safety Authorization Act, 45 V.S.C. 421; International Safe
Containers Act, 46 V.S.C. Sec. 1501; Surface Transportation Assitance Act, 49 V.S.C.
Sec. 2305.
36) See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 V.S.c. Sec. 651; Fed. Mine
Safety and Health Act, 30 V.S.C. Sec. 815; National Labor Relations Act, 29 V.S.C.
Sec. 151.
37) See, e.g., the development in California at Westman, supra note 5, Appendix D.
38) See, e.g., Knight v. Am.n Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1988).
39) See, e.g., Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employee
Disclosures To the Media: When Is A "Source" A "Sourcerer"?, 15 HASTINGSCOMM. &
ENr.L.I. 357, 373 n.103 ("neither of these theories has been utilized to any degree in
whistleblowing cases").
40) Compare Westman, supra note 5, at 1-20.
41) See Tim Bamett, Overview of state whistleblower protection statutes, 43 LABORLJ.
440, 441-442 (1992). For an example of whistleblower protection under a state
occupational safety and health statute, see Michael R. Smith, An Analysis Of The
Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act And Protected Activity Under The
Occupational Safety and Health Act of North Carolina, 15 CAMPBELLL. REv. 29
(1992).
42) See infra notes 161-234 and accompanying text.
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Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act covers private sector
whistleblowing as well.43
Rather than to depict the details of all existing sources of private whistleblower
protection law, this chapter will show the variety of the different approaches in the three
main sources of law shielding environmental whistleblowers: Federal environmental
statutes providing for administrative proceedings, state common law ton actions, and
state whistleblower statutes.

1. Federal Statutes: Protection By An Administrative Agency
Among the federal statutes containing whistleblower provisions, eight are traditionally
44

regarded as "environmental" in nature.

However, comprehensive federal whistleblower

legislation in the area of environmental law does not exist. Many irnpottant environmental
statutes do not contain such provisons, and the ones which do form an incoherent picture.

43) MONT.CODE ANN. Sec. 39-2-901.
44) See 42 V.S.C. Sec. 7401, Sec. 7622 (Clean Air Act, CAA); 42 V.S.C. Sec. 9601,
Sec. 9610 (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA); 42 V.S.C. Sec. 5801, Sec. 5851 (Energy Reorganization Act, ERA); 33
V.S.C. Sec. 1251, Sec. 1367 (Fed. Water Pollution Control Act, FWPCA); 42 U.S.c.
Sec. 300f, Sec. 300j-9 (Safe Drinking Water Act, SDW A); 42 V.S.C. Sec. 6901, Sec.
6971 (Solid Waste Disposal Act, SWDA); 30 V.S.C. Sec. 1201, Sec. 1293 (Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, SFMCRA); 15 V.S.C. Sec. 2601, Sec. 2622
(Toxic Substances Control Act, TSCA); although environmental protection shows often
considerable overlap with workplace or public safety and health, whistleblower
provisions in these fields are out of the scope of this anicle. See to whistleblowing
regarding workplace safety and health 29 V.S.C. Sec. 651, Sec. 660 (Occupational
Safety & Health Act); 30 V.S.C. Sec. 801, Sec. 815 (Fed. Mine Safety & Health Act);
29 V.S.C. Sec. 158 (National Labor Relations Act); 29 V.S.C. Sec. 1801, Sec. 1855
(Migrant Seasonal and Agricultural Worker Protection Act); Westman, supra note 6, at
72-75; James H. Swain, Protecting Individual Employees: Is It Safe To Complain About
Safety?, 9 BRIDGEPORTL.REv. 59 (1988); STEPHENM. KOHN & MICHAEL D. KOHN,
THE LABORLAWYER'SGUIDETo THE RIaHfS AND RESPONSIBILITIESOF EMPLOYEE
WmS1LEBWWERS 23-27 (1988); to whistleblower protection provisions in statutes
relating to the transpon industry compare 45 V.S.C. Sec. 421, Sec. 441 (Fed. Railroad
Safety Authorization Act); 46 V.S.c. Sec. 1501, Sec. 1506 (International Safe
Containers Act); 49 V.S.c. Sec. 2301, Sec. 2305 (Surface Transponation Assistance
Act); Kohn & Kohn, id. at 22-23, 30.
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Some of them adress certain industries only.45 Others cut across all industries,46 while
again others are focused on certain sources of danger for the environment 47
However, despite all the differences, the environmental whistieblower provisions have
certain common features. The most important is that they all protect whistieblowers by
providing for an administrative proceeding rather than giving each employee a right to sue
individually in court. Furthermore, although the procedural provisions differ, the scope
of substantive protection of all of them is quite similar. The language of the Energy
Reorganization Act (ERA), Safe Drinking Water Act (SDW A), T9xic substances Control
Act (TSCA) and Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) trace basically
that of the Clean Air Act (CAA). The same is true for the Solid Waste Disposal Act
(SWDA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA) with regard to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). The
legislative history of most of the statutes indicates 48 that Congress oriented itself on the
existing whistieblower provisions of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
(FMSHA)49 and the National Labor Relation Act (NLRA)50. And [mally, seven of the

45) 42 U.S.c. Sec. 5801, Sec. 5851 (ERA) and 30 U.S.c. Sec. 1201, Sec. 1293
(SMCRA).
46) 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7401, Sec. 7622 (CAA), 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1251, Sec. 1367
(FWPCA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300f, Sec. 300j-9 (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6901, Sec.
6971 (SWDA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601, Sec. 9610 (CERCLA) or 15 U.S.c. Sec. 2601,
Sec. 2622 (TSCA).
47) 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5801, Sec. 5851 (ERA) (nuclear facilities) and 15 U.S.C. Sec.
2601, Sec. 2622 (TSCA).
48) See S.Rep. No. 848, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 29 (CAA and FWPCA patterned after
NLRA and FMSHA); compare STEPHENM. KOHN, PROJECTINGENVIRONMENTAL&
NUCLEARWmSTLEBLOWERS:A LmGATIONMANUAL 15-16 (1985).
49) 30 U.S.c. Sec. 801, Sec. 815; compare for the ERA S.Rep. No. 95-848, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess. at 29, 1978 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News at 7303; Snow v.
Bechtel Constr. Inc., 647 F.Supp. 1514, 1517-18 (D.C. Cal. 1986).
50) 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158; see Kohn, supra note 48, at 15-16; Passaic Valley Sewerage
Comm'rs v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1993); Kansas Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1985).
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eight statutes are under the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Department of Labor, with six
of them following the same administrative rules. 5 1
Thus, for the purpose of showing the "model" of federal environmental
whistleblowing, this article will, besides depicting the common scope of substantive
protection, focus on the procedural rules under which the vast majority of these statutes
are admini· ster.ed 52

a. Substantive Protection
Relying on the legislative history of the environmental whistle blower statutes, the
courts have generally interpreted the scope of substantive protection under these
provisions broadly.53 Congress wanted to encourage employees to assist in the
enforcement of environmental law as a means of achieving a higher standard of
environmental quality54 and generally to prevent employers from silencing environmental
51) See 29 C.F.R Sec. 24.1 (a); the SMCRA is subject to the adjudicatory jurisdiction of
the Department of the Interior, see 30 U.S.C. 1293; 43 C.F.R. Part 4; 30 C.F.R. Part
865; see Kohn, supra note 48, at 185; Kohn & Kohn, supra note 44, at 27.
52) Besides the relatively small number of reported cases arising under the SMCRA and
CERCLA, see Eugene R. Fidell, Federal Protection Of Private Sector Health and Safety
Whistleblowers, 2 ADMINL.J. 1, 11 (1988), these proceedings are the model for the
proposed Fed. Uniform Health and Safety Whistleblower Act, see Westman, supra note
5, at 77; Susan Sauter, The Employee Health And Safety Whistleblower Protection Act
And The Conscientious Employee: The Potential For Federal Statutory Enforcement Of
The Public Policy Exception To Employment At Will. 59 CINNCINATIL.REv. 513
(1990).
53) See. e.g., Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 992 F.2d at
479; DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 286 (6th Cir. 1983) ("need for broad
construction of the statutory purpose"); Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Sys., Inc.,
735 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1984); Kohn, supra note 48, at 23; but see Brown &
Root, Inc. v. Donovan. 747 F.2d 1029, 1036 (5th Cir. 1984); the same is true for similar
whistleblower protection provisions in other statutes, see cit. at Kohn, supra note 48, at
23 n.23.
54) See legislative history of the FWPCA, cit in Conference Report of Clean Air Act,
1977 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 1077, 1404 "The best source of information
about what a company is actually doing or not doing is often its own employees, and this
amendment would insure that an employee could provide such information without losing
his job or otherwise suffering economically from retribution from the polluter"; see
S.Conf. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 82-83,at 83; 1972 U.S.Code Congo &
Admin. News 3668.3748 (to FWPCA) "Under this section employees and officials
could help assure that employers do not contribute to the degradation of our
environment" .
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concerns by threat of economic retaliation. 55 These underlying purposes, the derivation
of most of the environmental whistleblower statutes from the FMSHA and the NLRA,
and the substantially similar language of all of the statutes have led the courts to use
decisions under either the FMSHA, the NLRA or other environmental whistleblower
statutes as precedent 56

aa. Covered Relationship
The clear lan~ge

of the statutes covers all private sector employers57 as well as any

of their current employees, including temporary or probationary employees and
regardless of the respective function in the fIrm. 58 In view of the requirement of broad
interpretation of the statutes, the statutory protection has been extended to employees
blowing the whistle after the employment relationship was terminated. 59

bb. Protected Activity
Under the federal statutes following the language of the Clean Air Act,60 an employee
is protected who "commenced, caused to commence, or is about to commence or cause to
be commenced a proceeding under this chapter or a proceeding of the administration or
55) See, e.g., Statement of Representative William D. Ford .....we are only seeking to
protect workers and communities from those very few in industry who refuse to face up
to the fact that they are polluting out waterways, and who hope that by pressuring their
employees and frightening communities with economic threats, they will gain relief from
the requirement of any effluent limitation or abatement order"; see Kohn, supra note 48,
at 13-15; Lofgren, supra note 21, at 328.
56) See, e.g., Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 992 F.2d 474,
479 (3d Cir. 1993); Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir.
1985) (ERA, using CAA, FWPCA, FMSHA, NLMA); Consolidated Edison of New
York Co. v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1982) (using NLRA for ERA); Kohn,
supra note 48, at 22-23.
57) Kohn, supra note 48, at 18; Ellis Fischel State Cancer Hosp. v. Marshall, 629 F.2d
563,567 (8th Cir. 1980).
58) See Kohn, supra note 48, at 18-19.
59) See Flanagan v. Bechtel Power, 81-ERA-7, slip. op. of AU at 7-10 (Nov. 19,
1981); Kohn, supra note 48, at 19; Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 142144 (6th Cir. 1977).
60) See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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enforcement of any requirement imposed under this chapter ...,,61 The Solid Waste
Disposal Act and its progeny shields an employee who "has filed, instituted, or caused to
be filed or instituted any proceeding under this chapter.. ..,,62 Thus, only whistleblowing
with regard to violations of the respective act is protected. Although the statutes do not
explicitly specify the recipient to whom complaints may be made, the language indicates
that complaints may only be made to such persons having the power to carry through
"proceedings" under the acts.

aaa External Whistleblowing
With regard to external whistleblowing, blowing the whistle directly to the federal
environmental agencies charged with the enforcement of the respective statutes is
therefore clearly protected.63 As many of the environmental statutes contain criminal
provisions,64 reports to the appropriate federa1law enforcement officials are covered as
well. However, the courts have not yet decided whether reports to other governmental
agencies are covered. In distinguishing between "proceedings under this chapter" and
"proceedings of the administration or enforcement of any requirement imposed under this
chapter," the Clean Air Act and its progeny can be read to cover whistleblowing to other
government authorities, at least as long as their power includes enforcing one of the
requirements of the act, even when on a different legal basis and for a different
65

purpose.

The legislative history of the Clean Air Act makes specific reference to

"employee's exercise of rights under federal, state, or local Clean Air Act legislation or

61) 42 V.S.C. 7622 (a) (1).
62) 33 V.S.C. Sec. 1367 (a).
63) Ellis Fischel State Cancer Hosp. v. Marshall, 629 F.2d 563, 564 (8th Cir. 1980);
Snow v. Bechtel Const. Inc, 647 F.Supp. 1514 (D.C. Cal. 1986); Masters v. Daniel
Intern. Corp., 917 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1990); Kohn, supra note 48, at 24.
64) See, e.g., 42 V.S.C. Sec. 7413 (c) (CAA); 42 V.S.c. Sec. 6928 (d) (SOW A);
Riesel, supra note 27, at 521.
65) E.g. an enforcement action under OSHA regarding overly high concentrations of
hazardous air pollutants at the workplace.
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regulations, ,,66 thus indicating that the protection is not restricted to reports to the Federal
agencies charged with the administration of the Clean Air Act. Although otherwise
substantially identical with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, CERCLA explicitly
states that providing "information to a State or to the Federal Government,,67 is protected,
thus showing a broader application. Considering the congressional purpose, the Secretary
of Labor and the Administrative Law Judges have consistently interpreted the statutes to
68

cover reporting to state and local government bodies as well.

In view of the generally

broad interpretation of the statutes and considering the dictum in Passaic Sewerage v.
United States Dept. of Labor that the protection intended by Congress would be "largely
hollow if it were restricted to ...f11inga formal complaint with the appropriate external law
enforcement agency,,,69 it seems predictable that the courts will hold reports to other
government agencies covered.

bbb. Internal Whistleblowing
Internal whistleblowing is literally not covered under the language of most of tlle
statutes, as "proceedings" connotes a formal legal or administrative action?O However,
courts have overwhelmingly held that intracorporate whistleblowing is protected
activity.71 Internal whistleblowing fosters the congressional purpose of corporate

66) See House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th
Congr., 2d Sess.; Kohn, supra note 48, at 25.
67) 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9610 (a).
68) See Kohn, supra note 48, at n24.
69) Passaic Sewerage v. Dept. of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478 (3d Cir. 1993).
70) Brown & Roots, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1984) (ERA);
Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F.Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Illinois 1993).
71) See Passaic Sewerage 992 F.2d at 478-479; Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F.Supp.
266,270 (N.D.lllinois) (False Calims Act); Jones v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 948 F.2d
258,264 (6th Cir. 1991) (ERA); Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735 F.2d
1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1984) (ERA); Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505,
1510-12 (10th Cir. 1985) (ERA), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1011, 106 S.Ct. 3311,92
L.Ed. 724 (1986); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982)
(ERA); Pogue v. United States Dept. of Labor, 940 F.2d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir. 1991);
Kohn, supra note 48, at 26.
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compliance with environmental law by either facilitating voluntary remediation and
compliance or affording management the opportunity to justify and clarify its
environmental policies to its employees.72 The 5th Circuit's 73 objections to such broad
application of the Energy Reorganization Act's whistleblower provisons, based on the
formal language argument as well as on the concern that otherwise the Department of
Labor's supervisory power would expand into the area of mediating employee,employer
relations and thus in an area viewed by the court as the discretionary domain of corporate
management,14 has been unanimously rejected by the other Courts of Appeals?5
Moreover, Congress in 1992 amended the Energy Reorganization Act to protect an
employee who "notified his employer of alleged violations ....',76 As it can be assumed
that Congress was aware that a conflict as to whether internal whistleblowing is protected
or not existed only regarding the Energy Reorganization Act,77 the amendment shows
general congressional intent to protect intracorporate complaints as well.
Closely connected with the issue of internal whistleblowing is the question whether an
employee is protected who threatens or states the intention to report externally. Under the
statutes following the language of the Clean Air Act, this activity is protected under the
phrasing "about to commence. ,,78 Although the other statutes do not contain similar
language, the arguments made for protecting internal whistleblowing support an
extension in this case as well. Threats of external whistleblowing will be often used to
effectuate internal reports, and the effect of such threats or statements is the same as the
one of internal reports.
72) See Passaic Sewerage, 992 F.2d at 478-479.
73) Brown & Roots. 747 F.2d at 1029; In Re Willy, 831 F.2d 545,548 (5th Cir. 1987)
(upheld); Garg v. Narron, 710 F.Supp. 1116 (S.D.Tex. 1989) (following without
discussion).
74) Brown & Roots, 747 F.2d at 1031-32.
75) See Jones, 948 F.2d at 264; Mackowiak, 735 F.2d at 1163; Kansas Gas, 780 F.2d at
1510-12; Consolidated Edison, 673 F.2d at 61.
76) See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5851 (a) (1) (A).
77) Compare Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266, 270 (N.D. Illinois 1993).
78) See Couty v. Dole, 886 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1989) (ERA); Kohn, supra note 48, at
25-26.
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ccc. Good Faith Allegations
The congressional intent to allow employees to voice their environmental concerns
makes clear that not the specific validity of information, but the ability to communicate
perceived environmental wrongdoing, is protected. 79 Therefore, the courts have held that
not only true, but also false, allegations are covered as long as they are made in good
faith.80 Otherwise not only would the Department of Labor have to determine the truth of
allegations possibly concerning complicated technical matters8l but denial of protection
for allegations which - possibly after exhaustive investigation by experts - are proven
unfounded would have a chilling effect on employee initiative in bringing to light
perceived wrongdoing.82

cc. Discriminatory Conduct And Motive
The statutes following the language of the Clean Air Act prohibit an employer to
discharge or "otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. ,,83 Without explicitly
restricting prohibited retaliatory measures to those directly affecting the employment
relationship, the language of the statutes following the the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act covers employers who discharge or "in any other way discriminate against"
84

the whistleblower.

However, although courts generally construe whistleblower

protection broadly, 85 it seems none has so far included retaliatory employer behavior
79) See House Interstate and Foreign Committee Report on the CAA, H.R. Rep. No.
294, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.; Kohn, supra note 48, at 30; DeFord v. Secretary of Labor,

700 F.2d 281, 286 (6th Cir. 1983).
80) See Passaic Sewerage v. Dept. of Labor, 992 F.2d 474,478 (3d Cir. 1993)
(FWPCA); Brown & Roots, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029, 1034 (5th Cir. 1984);
Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987) ("good faith
refusal" sufficient); compare cit. at Kohn, supra note 48, at 28 (fitie VII-cases).
81) See Kansas Gas & E1ec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505,1508-10 (lOth Cir. 1985);
Kohn, supra note 48, at 29.
82) Passaic Sewerage. 992 F.2d at 479.
83) 42 D.S.C. Sec. 7622 (a) (CAA).
84) 33 D.S.C. Sec. 1367 (a) (WPCA).
85) See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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under this language which does not affect the employment relationship itself.
Discriminatory oonduct has been found in practically every retaliatory action related to the
·
hi p, 86 suc h as mtunI
..
'd'anon an d h arassment, 87. restraInts, 88
emp Ioyment re Ianons
transfers,89 blacklisting and the like,90 but not, for example, in independent tort claims,
such as defamation actions.
The discriminatory conduct must have been motivated by the protected whistleblowing
activity of the employee.91 As the nature of employer motive as a subjective factor makes
it hard for the employee to prove, the ultimate outcome of a case very often depends on
who carries the burden of proof. In whistleblower cases under federal law , the courts
follow the standard the Supreme Court has developed in Mount Healthy City School
2

District Board of Education v. Doyle.9

Under the Mount Healthy standard, the whistleblower has to state a prima facie case
by providing direct or circumstancial evidence that creates a reasonable inference of

86) Kohn, supra note 48, at 19; compare Passaic Sewerage, 992 F.2d at 480 ("adverse
action"); Couty v. Dole, 886 F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir. 1989); Lockert v. U.S. Dept. of
Labor, 867 F.2d 513,519 (9th Cir. 1989); DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281,
286 (6th Cir. 1983), Ellis Fischel State Cancer Hosp. v. Marshall, 629 F.2d 563, 566
(8th Cir. 1980).
87) Compare Pogue v. United States Dept. of Labor, 940 F.2d 1287,1288 (9th Cir.
1991); Dunham v. Brock, 794 F.2d 1037, 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
88) See, e.g., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d
65 (removal from job and placement on layoff list).
89) Compare DeFord, 700 F.2d at 283; Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Sys., Inc.,
735 F.2d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984); Garg v. Narron, 710 F.Supp. 1116 (S.D.Tex.
1989).
90) See 29 C.F.R. Sec. 24.2 (b); to decisions to "unlawful discrimination" under the
NLRA see Kohn, supra note 48, at 21 and John P. Ludington, Employer Discrimination
Against Employeesfor Filing Charges of Giving Testimony under NLRA, 35 ALR FED.
132, Sec.48-77.
91) See Lockert v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 867 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1989); DeFord, 700
F.2d at 286; Mackowiak, 735 F.2d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 1984) (ERA); Passaic Sewerage
v. Dept. of Labor, 992 F.2d 474,480 (3d Cir. 1993) (FWPCA); Dunham v. Brock, 794
F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1986); Couty v. Dole, 886 F.2d 147,148 (8th Cir. 1989); Kohn,
supra note 48, at 30.
92) 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568,50 L.Ed2d 471.
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discriminatory motive.93 Inter alia,94 the employee may show that he was a valued
employee by presenting satisfactory work performance ratings,95 pay raises shortly
before the whistleb10wing,96 or that there were no complaints about him and his
performance. He may then demonstrate that after his complaint, management changed its
attitude, or that he was transfered or treated differently compared to other employees in a
similar situation without a proven 97 cause like lower performance or violation of his

. 98
dutIes.
Furthermore, :not only the fact that the alleged reason for discrimination is out of
proportion to the conduct, but also the way management behaves after the whistleb10wing
may show discriminatory motive. The manner in which the employee was informed, the
absence of a warning, deviation from established procedures or inadequate investigation
of charges may create circumstancial evidence for discriminatory motive. Finally,
management's general low regard of corporate environmental officers and remarks
disqualifying the employee's protected activity as "disloyal" and the like may create
eVI'dence. 99
After the whistleb10wer, by preponderance of evidence, raises a reasonable inference
of discriminatory motive, the employer may rebut it by providing evidence that legitimate
business reasons caused his conduct 100 The employee can then prove that the alleged
business reasons were "pretextual," i.e. that they either not exist or that the employer in
93) ld.; Lockert, 867 F.2d at 513; DeFord, 700 F.2d at 286; Passaic Sewerage, 992 F.2d
at 480; Couty, 886 F.2d at 148.
94) See the general categories in Am. Jurisprudence, Proof of Facts (2nd), "Proof of
Retaliatory Termination," Sec. 7-1; Kohn & Kohn" supra note 48, at 77-80.
95) See, e.g., Ellis Fischel State Cancer Hosp. v. Marshall, 629 F.2d 563, 566 (8th Cir.
1980); Pogue v. United States Dept. of Labor, 940 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1991).
96) See Ellis Fischel State Cancer Hosp., 629 F.2d at 565; Lockert, 867 F.2d at 516;
Couty, 886 F.2d at 147.
97) See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982).
98) See, e.g., Ellis Fischel State Cancer Hospita, 629 F.2d at 566; DeFord v. Secretary
of Labor, 700 F,2d 281,286 (6th Cir. 1983).
99) Compare Kohn, supra note 48, at 31-34.
100) Passaic Sewerage v. Dept. of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 480 (3d Cir. 1993); Lockert,
867 F.2d at 520.
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fact did not rely on them. 101 The ultimate burden of proof for pretext remains with the
employee.102. ili many cases, however, the evidence will support both a discriminatory
motive and a legitimate business reason for the employer's conduct. In such" dual
motive" cases,103 the employee has only to prove that the discriminatory motive "played
some part" in the employer's conduct. 104 The employer carries the burden of proof that
the conduct in question would have occured even if the employee had not engaged in the
protected activity. 105 Thus, the employer bears the risk that the influence of legal and
illegal motives

0/1

106

his conduct cannot be separated.

b. Procedure And Remedies
Except for the Surface Mining Control Act and CERCLA, all of the federal
environmental statutes containing whistleblower provisions are administered by the
Department of Labor. 107 Proceedings are instituted by a written complaint with the
101) See DeFord, 700 F.2d at 286; Kohn, supra note 48, at 35; Kohn & Kohn, supra
note 44, at 80-81.
102) See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981); Kohn
& Kohn, supra note 44, at 81.
103) Compare Lockert, 867 F.2d at 519; Pogue v. United States Dept. of Labor, 940
F.2d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir. 1991).
104) See Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576,
50 L.Ed.2d 471 ("substantial or motivating factor in decision"); Mackowiak v. University
Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1984); Consolidated Edison Co.
v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61,62-63 (2d Cir. 1982); Dunham v. Brock, 794 F.2d 1037,
1040 (5th Cir. 1986).
105) "But for"-test, see Mackowiak, 735 F.2d at 1163-64; Passaic Sewerage v. Dept. of
Labor, 992 F.2d 474,480 (3d Cir. 1993); Consolidated Edison, 673 F.2d at 62-63; Mt.
Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287; Dunham, 794 F.2d at 1040.
106) See Pogue, 940 F.2d at 1290; Mackowiak, 735 F.2d at 1163-64; Kohn, supra note
44, at 37; Kohn & Kohn, supra note 44, at 81; the underlying reasons for that allocation
is that "the employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is declared illegal
by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of legal and illegal motives
cannot be separated because ...the risk was created by his own wrongdoing," NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393,403 (1986).
107) These proceedings are governed by two set of administrative rules. 29 C.F.R. Part
24 specifies the procedure for claims under the employee protection statutes, while 29
C.F.R. Part 18 contains all the general litigation rules before the Office of AU. In case of
conflict between the rules, 29 C.F.R. Part 18 controls. The Fed.R.Civ.P. and the
Admin.P.A. are used as default rules, see 29 C.f.R. Sec. 18.1, 18.29 (7) and (8); Kohn,
supra note 48, at 87.
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Administrator of the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division or any of its local
offices within 30 days after the alleged discrimination occured. After investigating, the
Administrator has to render a decision stating the reasons for his finding of whether the
complaint is meritorious or not If he fmds that the alleged discrimination occured, his
notice to the parties includes an appropriate order to abate the violation. The decision
becomes the fmal and binding order of the Secretary of Labor unless a request for a
hearing is fIled within five days. The Administrative Law Judge assigned to the case must
schedule a hearing date within 7 days after the receipt of the request The parties may file
pre-hearing briefs and may use the standard discovery rules. The Administrative Law
Judge issues a recommended decision within 20 days after the hearing is terminated and
forwards it to the Secretary of Labor. Within 90 days after the original complaint was
filed, the Secretary has to render his final order. Although he is not bound by any legal
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, the Secretary can only reject a factual
determination if there are substantial grounds on the record for such a departure. 108
If he fmds a violation of the whistleblower law, the Aministrative Law Judge typically
orders reinstatement in the same or an equivalent position, backpay and, depending on the
circumstances, other "make whole" remedies. 109 Compensatory damages, 110 including
compensation for emotional distress, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and lost future
earnings 111 are available under all of the environmental whistleblower statutes. V nder
both the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Secretary
112

has discretionary power to award punitive damages.

However, the statutory silence of

108) See Kohn, supra note 44, at 71; compare Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565
F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977) (close scrutiny by courts).
109) See Kohn, supra note 44, at 61 (e.g. reimbursement for lost ovetime, good
recommendation, front pay etc.).
110) See 29 C.ER. Sec. 24.6; DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 288 (6th
Cir. 1983); Blackburn v. Martin, 982 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1992).
111) Kohn, supra note 48, at 62; compare Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., Inc.,
653 F.2d 1057, 1064 (5th Cir. 1981)
112) 15 V.S.c. Sec. 2622 (b) (TSCA); 42 V.S.C. Sec. 300j-9 (i) (SDW A).
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the other statutes has been interpreted to mean that punitive damages are not available. 113
all
F·my,

th e comp'I amant
.
114 may recover reasona bl e Ii'tIgatIon
.. expenses, mc Iudin g

attorney's fees,

115

under all of the statutes.

When the employer does not comply with the final order of the Secretary, it may be
enforced by the Federal district court. I 16 Upon fIling a petition for review within 60 days
after the Secretary's final order was issued, judicial review by the Federal Court of
Appeals under the standard whether the order is "unsupported by "substantial evidence"
or "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law" 117 is available.

2. State Common Law: The Public Policy Whistleb10wer Tort
Although most American private sector employment is at-will, the traditional rule of
free severability at any time has been eroded substantially within the last 30 years. Most
.. one or more SIgnifiIcant exceptIons
.
. 118
states now recogmze
to th e at-w ill d octrme.
Inter alia, courts have developed a body of protective law on the basis of public policy
considerations. The underlying idea for that exception to at-will is that employees should
not be discharged for asserting certain rights that society has an interest in protecting. 119
Over the years, four groups of protected activities have evolved. With varying scope,
most courts protect employees from discharges in retaliation for fulfIlling a public

113) See Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 NW.2d 569 (Minn. 1987); Kohn,
supra note 48, at 64.
114) But not the respondent, see Kohn, supra note 48, at 65
115) Kohn, supra note 48, at 65; Westman, supra note 5, at 78; 29 C.F.R. Sec. 24.6.
(3).
116) Westman, supra note 5, at 78-79; Kohn, supra note 48, at 83, 85.
117) See Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (9th
Cir. 1984); Pogue v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 940 F.2d 1287,1288 (9th Cir. 1991);
Lockert v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 867 F.2d 513, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1989); see
Fed.Adrnin.P.A., 5 U.S.C. Sec. 701; Kohn, supra note 48, at 71-81.
118) Compare Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust Dismissal Legislation in the
United States, 44 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 644 (1991)
119) See Rongione, supra note 5, at 294.
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obligation, exercising a statutory right, refusing to participate in illegal or unethical acts
and, to some lesser extent, for whistleblowing. Although more than 20 jurisdictions now
protect whistleblowing on a theory of public policy, several courts have explicitly refused
to acknowledge a whistleblower exception to at_will,l20 while other jurisdictions have
not taken a clear position yet.
However, the scope of protection differs immensely within the jurisdictions
..
.
A s one au th or no ted , 121 the excepuon
., s "on Iy
recogmzmg
a pu bl'IC po l'ICY excepuon.
consistency is it~ inconsistency." Therefore, the following decription shows the different
.' l'ar quesuons among courts, as we II as th e maJonty
..
answers to pamcu
tren d . 122

a. Substantive Protection
Whistleblowing concerning the violation of environmental law has only in a few cases
..
given
nse to a d"eclslon

0f

. to
a court. 123 H owever, courts h ave ha d amp Ie opportumty

decide on retaliatory measures by employers against employees reporting alleged
violations of law either to government authorities or internally. Despite some
inconsistencies, several general lines of reasoning have evolved.

aa. Protected Activity
Environmental whistleblowing by definition means reporting violations of
environmental laws. 124 However, the majority of courts does not take any violation of

120) See Nina G. Stillman, Wrongful Discharge: Public Policy And Tort Claims. in 21st
Annuallnsitute on Employment Law 25 (pLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Handbook Series
No. H4-5137, 1992), available in Westlaw No. 92 PLI/Lit 379.
121) Atkins, supra note 4, at 546.
122) For a state by state survey see Kohn & Kohn, supra note 44, at 39-72; Westman,
supra note 5, Appendices A-D.
123) See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980);
Phung v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986); Schwartz v. Michingan
Sugar Co., 308 N.W.2d 459 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo &
Ironton R.R., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich.Ct. App. 1978); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club,
Inc., 476 so.2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 1985).
124) See infra pp. 5-6.
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law as a basis for a public policy but acknowledges only constitutional or statutory
provisions, not judge-made law, as possible sources of public policy. 125 Moreover, the
majority of courts agree that the retaliatory measure must be in contrast to a "clear
mandate of public policy" expressed in the violated statute. 126 However, the judiciary
has been unable to defme exactly and consistently what is in the interest of the public, as
opposed to private party interest, and sometimes has even reached contrary results
127
reg ardin g th e same statute.
With regard to environmental law, a clear mandate of public policy of both the states
and the federal govemmentl28

to protect reports of violations can be seen in the ever

increasing number of both state and federal laws aimed at protecting the environment. 129
Accordingly, whistleblowing regarding violations of environmental laws has been mostly
protected by the courts. 130 Moreover, the violation of many environmental laws is a
crime.131 Some courts have stated that the enforcement of criminal provisions is one of
the most important public policies of a state. 132 Although other courts have not protected
employees reporting crimes, the refusal to protect whistleblowing in these cases was

125) See, e.g., Gantt v. Sentry Ins., I Cal.4th 1083, 824 P.2d 680, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874
(1992); Westman, supra note 5, at 108 n.96
126) Bishop v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 908 F.2d 658,662 (10th Cir. 1990);
Gantt, I Cal.4th at 1083, 824; Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp, 84 N.J. 58,417
A.2d 505, 512 (1980).
127) Compare Pratt v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 149 Ill.2d 556, 506 N.E.2d 959 (1987)
(Foreign Corrupt Practices Act" did not "enunciate a clearly mandated policy of the state")
with Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219,685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (clear
expression of public policy); Harless v. First Nat'l. Bank, 162 W.Va. 116,246 S.E.2d
270 (1978) with Gil v. Metal Servo Corp., 412 So.2d 706 (La. App.), cert. denied, 414
So.2d 379 (La. 1982) (state consumer protection laws); see Rongione, supra note 5, at
23; Robert D. Boyle, A Review of Whistle-Blower Protections and Suggestions for
Change, 41 LABOR L.J. 801, 826 (1990).
128) See Adler V. Am. Standard Corp., 538 F.Supp. 572, 579 (D.Md. 1982) (federal
public policy may form basis for state abusive discharge suit), but see Rachford V.
Evergreen Int. Airlines, Inc., 596 F.Supp. 384 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (no clear mandate of
public policy of the state for reporting violations of federal law).
129) See Kohn, supra note 48, at 161.
130) Atkins, supra note 4, at 545 n.77.
131) Compare Riesel, supra note 27, at 521.
132) See e.g. Palmateer V. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124,421 N.E.2d 876,
879 (S.Ct. Ill. 1981); Kohn, supra note 48, at 161-62; Westman, supra note 5, at 104.
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basically due to the fact that the discharging employer was the only victim of the
crime.133 On the contrary, environmental crimes victimize not only a single person, but
society as a whole. However, despite this theoretical justification for criminal provisions
creating a public policy, courts seem generally not to rely on the nature of the violation as
civil or criminal. 134 Instead, the recipient of the whistleblowing and the effect of the
violations on third persons or the public seems to be determinative.

aaa. External Whistleblowing
External whistleblowing to all kinds of public authorities has been generally held
135

protected by the courts, regardless of whether the violation of law was criminal
. il' m
CIV

or

nature. 136

bbb. Internal Whistleblowing
Although not entirely consistent, courts follow basically two lines of reasoning
regarding the reporting of violations of law to internal recipients.
The majority of courts deny a public policy claim when either the employer is the only
victim of the reported crime or when he is the only one (potentially) 137 damaged by the
violation of the law. 138 The rationale behind this approach seems to be that internal
133) See infra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
134) Westman, supra note 5, at 107.
135) See Palmateer, 85 Il1.2d 124,421 N.E.2d at 879 (criminal conduct by co-workers
reported to local law enforcement authorities); Potter v. Village Bank of N.J., 225 N.J.
Super. 547,543 A.2d 80 (App.Div.), cert. denied, 113 N.J. 352, 550 A.2d 462 (1988)
(bank executives reporting suspected money laundering); Wagner v. City of Globe, 150
Ariz. 82,722 P.2d 250 (1986) (police officer reporting illegal arrest and detention to a
magistrate); Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 39, at 375-76; Westman, supra note 5, at
104-105.
136) See Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.Ct.App. 1985) (employee
reporting violations of administrative safety procedures to OSHA and FDA); Prince v.
Rescorp Realty, 940 F.ld 1104 (7th Cir. 1991) (reporting violations of Illinois State Fire
Marshall Act to village officials); Siniscalo, supra note 11, at 14.
137) Foley v. Interactive Data Corp, 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373
(1988) (reporting that designated superior under investigation for embezzlement).
138) See Vonch v. Carlson Companies, 439 N.W.2d 406 (Minn.App. 1989) (reporting
alleged travel and expense account improprieties which constitued theft and fraud by co-
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disclosure in those and similar cases is considered "merely ...private or proprietary,'.l39
and that the COints should not interfere in such internal employee-employer relations 140.
However, when third persons 141 or the public 142 are affected, most courts acknowledge
an action for wrongful discharge. Then, the effects of the wrongdoing leave the internal
circle, and the courts obviously see the need for corrective action. Furthermore, it appears
that the courts want to give employees who seek the resolution of such problems within
their organization at least not less protection than when they choose the more disruptive
. to 1aw e nf orcement .au th onnes.
..
143 A's envrronment al' cnmes
.""""uect t he
way 0f reportIng,
employee); Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1990)
(alleged inventory theft and kickbacks); Mello v. Stop & Shop Cos., 402 Mass. 555, 524
N.E.2d 105 (1988) (false claims based on alleged inventory shortages); American
Computer Corp. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal.App.3d 664, 261 Cal.Rptr. 796 (1989)
(employee reporting concealement and misuse of company funds by co-employee); Petrik
v. Monarch Printing Corp., 111 Ill.App.3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1st Dist. 1982)
(reporting suspected embezzlement of company funds by co-employees), but see
Yaniecki v. P.A. Bergner and Co. of Illinois, 143 Ill.App.3d 668, 493 N.E.2d 419 (3d
Dist. 1986) (declining to follow Petrik).
139) Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev.S.Ct. 1989).
140) See House v. Carter-Wallace Inc., 556 A.2d. 353, 357 (N.J. Super.Ct.App. 1989);
Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 39, at 376.
141) See Harless v. First Nat'!. Bank, 162 W.Va. 116,246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) (efforts
to stop intentional violations of state consumer protection act), but see Gil v. Metal Serv.
Corp., 412 So.2d 706 (La. App.), cert. denied, 414 So.2d 379 (La. 1982) (protection
denied) ; Palmer v. Brown, 242 Kan. 893,752 P.2d 685 (1988) (reporting Medicaid
fraud; Adler v. Am.n Standard Corp., 538 F.Supp. 572 (D.Md. 1982) (complaint about
violations of federal antitrust, tax, and foreign corrupt practices acts); with regard to
health care see McQuary v. Belair Convalescent Home, 69 Or.App. 107,684 P.2d 21
(1984) (threat to report patient abuse to state authorities); Hibbert v. Centennial Villas,
Inc., 56 Wash App. 889,786 P.2d 309 (1990) (reporting unsafe nursing care); McCool
v. Hillhaven Corp., 97 Or.App. 536,777 P.2d 1013 (1989) (complaints about patient
abuse); Jenkins v. Family Health Care Ptogram, 214 Cal.App.3d 440,262 Cal.Rptr. 798
(1989); Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary Management Servs., 188 Cal. App.3d 1437,234
Cal. Rptr. 129 (1987) (complaint about substandard health care); Siniscalo, supra note
11, at 15; Westman, supra note 5, at 108.
142) see Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471,427 A.2d 385 (1980)
(reporting violations of state food and drug law); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc.,
726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (Cal. law), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985) (reporting
violation of state food law); Johnson v. World Color Ptess, Inc., 147 lll.App.3d 746,
498 N.E.2d 575 (5th Dist. 1986), app. denied, 505 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1987) (complaint
that certain fmancial statements do not conform with federal securities laws); but see
Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1990) (complaint about toxic
chemical leaks not protected when employee's job did not include protecting against or
investigating such leaks).
143) See Westman, supra note 5, at 114.
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public, blowing the whistle internally is protected under this line of reasoning.
l44
Accordingly, courts have protected embryonic whistleblowing
as well as threats to go
externallyl45

as well.

However, a second, and minority, line of reasoning denies protection for internal
whistleblowing based on social utility considerations. 146 When learning of illegal
conduct through internal whistleblowing, the employer can prevent wrongdoing in the
future. However, the only way to have the wrongdoer punished for criminal or other acts
subject to government disciplinary action is to report them to government authorites.
Reporting to government authorities is something the employee could have done hinself
without involving the employer, and he would have been protected by doing it. Thus,
internal whistleblowing serves no purpose with regard to the societal interest in the
punishment of crimes. Moreover, although internal whistleblowing may lead to legal
compliance in the future, the decision to take action is, in the case of internal
whistleblowing, entirely at the discretion of the employer. Thus, law enforcement is not
obstructed when an internal whistleblower is discharged, as the employee's behavior
147

failed to make sure law enforcement occured.

In essence, this approach views the

mere chance that internal whistleblowing may lead to future legal compliance by the
employer as not worth protecting. Only whistleblowing which makes sure law is
enforced, such as external whistleblowing to government authorities, is protected.

144) Johnston v. DelMar Distrib.Co., 776 S.W.2d 768 (Texas 1989) (employee
contacting government agency to ask whether mislabeling of fIrearms is illegal); see
Westman, supra note 5, at 114.
145) McQuary, 69 Or.App. at 107.
146) See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 39, at 376.
147) See House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 556 A.2d 353,356 (N.J. Super.Ct. App. Div.
1989); Zaniecki v. P.A. Bergner & Co., 493 N.E.2d 419, 420-21 (IlLApp.Ct. 1986) (no
obstruction of law enforcement); Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 40, at 376
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ccc. Good Faith Allegations
Regarding both internal and external whistleblowing, courts unanimously protect only
reporting in good faith. Thus, the employee has to believe that the wrongdoing occured
and violates· a statute. 148 Investigations by the employee to ascertain his belief have been
looked disfavorly at by the courts, as they disrupt the internal climate of a
organization. 149 Good faith requires furthermore that the whistleblowing is primarily
motivated to correct the alleged wrongdoing. Reporting primarily as a means to pursue
other interests is,not protected. 150

bb. Discriminatory Conduct And Motive
Most jurisdictions limit protection of whistleblowers to discharge,151 with only a few
152

shielding whistleblowers from other forms of adverse employer conduct.

With regard

to proving discriminatory motive, most courts follow the Mount Healthyl53

standard,

148) McQuary v. Belair Convalescent Home, 69 Or.App. 107,684 P.2d 21 (1984);
Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Johnston v.
DelMar Distrib. Co., 776 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Texas 1989); Westman, supra note 5, at
115; Rongione, supra note 5, at 294; but see Stuart v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 753 F.Supp,
317 (D.Kan. 1990) (applying objective standard ifreasonable person would have
concluded that violation occured),
149) Giudice v. Drew Chern. Corp., 210 N.J. Super. 32, 509 A.2d 200 (1986); compare
the dissenting opinion in Palmateer v. Int. Harvester Co., 85 m.2d 124,421 N.E.2d
876,884 (TIl.S.Ct. 1980) ("spying could seriously affect the labor relations of his
employer").
150) See Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. App. Ct. 1980);
Westman, supra note 5, at 115.
151) See Ludwig v. C.& A. Wallcoverings, Inc., 750 F.Supp. 339 (N.d.Ill. 1990)
(lliinois law); Anderson v. Pacific Bell, 204 Cal.App.3d 277, 251 Cal.Rptr. 66 (1988);
Siniscalo, supra note 4, at 16.
152) See Garcia v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 187 Cal.App.3d 1556,232 Cal.Rptr. 490
(1986); Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 81 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. Super.Ct. 1989).
153) Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50
L.Ed.2d 471
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b. Procedure And Remedies
Actions based on the public policy exception against retaliatory discharge are brought
by the individual employee in civil court With the exception of one jurisdiction, 154
courts locate the source of the employer's duty not to discharge not in the employment
contract, but in public policy, and therefore allow the full range of tort damages,
· IUdi ng purntIve
..
d arnages. 155
InC

3. State Whistleblower Statutes
After the first whistleblower statutes were enacted in response to nation-wide scandals
· th e Iate seventIes
. an d ear 1y elg
. h'tIes, 156 many states h'ave, With mcreasIng
..
In
spee d , 157
followed in the hope that removing barriers to employee efforts to report violations of law
will lead to more stringent compliance. 158 Currently, of the approximately 35 states
having" general" statutes not restricted to employees blowing the whistle on wrongdoing
· a certaIn
.. Ind ustry or on VIO
. I'atlOns 0 f' a SIngIe statute, 159 at Ieast 15 protect pnvate
.
In
sector employees. 160 Furthermore, the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment
Act codifies the common law public policy exception to at-will including whistleblowing.

154) Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis.2d 562, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983); see
Vandergrift v. American Brands Corp., 572 F.Supp. 496 D.N.H. (1983) (tort-contract
mixture, but tort damages).
155) See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp, 47 Cal.3d 654, 667, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 215,
765 P.2d 373, 377-78 (1988); Oakes v. New England Diaries, Inc., 291 Conn. 1,591
A.2d 1261 (1991); Stillman, supra note 120, at 47; Westman, supra note 5, at 115-117.
156) See for Michigan Dworkin & Near, supra note 8, at 253.
157) See Lofgren, supra note 21, at 332.
158) See, e.g., Melchi v. Burns Intern. Sec. Servs., Inc., 597 F.Supp. 575 (D.C. 1984)
(Michigan Law); Chilingirian v. City of Fraser, 194 Mich.App. 65,486 N.W.2d 347
(1992); Dworkin & Near, supra note 8, at 253.
159) See compilations at Lofgren, supra note 21, at 351 nA8; Westman, supra note 5,
Appendix. B; Miceli & Near, supra note 6, table 6-2.
160) See CAL. LAB. CODE Sec. 1102.5; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 31-51m; FLA.
STAT. Sec. 112.3187 (1)-(10); HAW. REv. STAT. Sec. 378-61; IND. CODE ANN. Sec.
22-5-3-3; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 30:2027; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, Sec. 831;
MICH. COMPoLAWS Sec. 15.361; MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.932; N.H. REv. STAT.
Sec. 275-E:1; N.J. STAT. ANN. Sec. 34:19-1; N.Y. LAB. LAW Sec. 740; OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. Sec. 4113.51; OR. REv. STAT. Sec. 659.550; R.I. GEN. LAWS Sec. 36-151; TENN. CODE ANN. Sec. 50-1-304.
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Despite the common feature that virtually all statutes give the individual employee a
civil cause of action, the statutes vary greatly in detail. However, depicting the scope and
procedural way of protection 161 will show the different legislative attempts to deal with a
certain aspect

a. Substantive Protection

aa. Covered Relationships
Of the 15 statutes covering private sector employees, most define "employer" simply
by having a certain number of employees,162 while four only apply to employers which
. 0 f emp Ioyees 164 IS
.. m some statutes exten de d to a
are state contractors. 163 Th e protecUon
"person acting on behalf of the employee." 165

bb. Protected Activity
With variations in detail, all statutes protect disclosure of illegal behavior to
government autl1orities. However, some deny protection for internal whistleblowing,
while others require prior internal reporting or exhausting administrative procedures

161) For descriptions of related groups of statutes see Dworkin & Near, supra note 8, at
244-253; Westman, supra note 5, at 61-71.
162) See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. Sec. 378-61; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, Sec. 832
(b); MICH. COMPoLAWS Sec. 15.361 (b); MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.931; N.H. REv.
STAT. Sec. 275-E:1; N.Y. LAB. LAW Sec. 740 (1) (b) ; MONT.CODE ANN. Sec. 39-2903 (3) ("one or more"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 31-5lm ("who has employees,"
i.e. at least two); FLA. STAT. Sec. 112.3187 (1)-(10) (ten or more).
163) See IND. CODE Sec. 22-5-3-3 (a); FLA.STAT. Sec. 112.3187 (1)-(10); OR. REV.
STAT. Sec. 659.510; R.I. GEN.LAWS Sec. 36-15-1 (employer receiving more than USD
200.000,- in public funds in preceding 12 months), Sec. 36-15-9 (a) (employer subject to
provisions of ti. 23 ch. 19.1 (violations of toxic disposal law).
164) "Employee" is in all statutes essentialy defmed as a person perlorming services for
renumeration, see e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 31-51m (1); to the "economic
reality" test to determine whether an individual is an employee see Chilingirian v. City of
Fraser, 194 Mich. App. 65, 486 N.W.2d 347 (1992).
165) See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 3l-51m (b); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
Sec. 833 (1) A.; MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.932 (a); R.I.GEN. LAWS Sec. 36-15-3.
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before blowing the whistle extema11y. Two states explicitly require an employee to show
"clear and convincing evidence" that he was blowing the whistle on illegal behavior. 166

aaa External Whistleblowing
The act of communicating, the recipients of external whistleblowing and the
wrongdoing are mostly defined broadly. Most statutes cover either "reporting" 167 or
"disclosing information," 168 while others expressly include embryonic
. 169.Indirec t w hi stl e b·IoWIng
. 170 or thre ats to di scIose. 171 .
w h·IStl e bl OWIng,
Recipients to whom whistleblowing is protected encompass in all statutes practically
all government authorities on all levels of government. 172
With regard to the reported wrongdoing, the majority of statutes include any violation
of federal, state or locallaw.I73

Despite the broad language, however, two courts have

166) MICH. COMPoLAWS Sec. 15.362 (4); R.I. GEN. LAWS Sec. 36-15-4 (d).
167) See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 31-5Im (b); HAW. REv. STAT. Sec.
378-62; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, Sec. 833 (1) A.,B.; MICH. COMPoLAWS Sec.
15.362; MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.932; MONT. CODE ANN. Sec. 39-2-904 (1).
168) CAL. LAB. CODE Sec. 1102.5 (b); LA. aV. CODE ANN. art. 30:2027 (1); N.J.
STAT. ANN. Sec. 34:19-3; N.Y. LAB. LAW Sec. 740 (2) (a); the term "refusing to be
silent" in TENN. CODEANN. Sec. 50-1-304 (a) is probably just a semantic variation, not
a requirement of a prior order of the employer; to New Jersey see Smith v. Travelers
Mortg. Serv., 699 F.Supp. 1080 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding individual claim to Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission not as "disclosure"); contra Sandom v. Travelers
Mortgage Serv., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 1240 (D.N.J. 1990) (sex discriminatioon claim to
same commission).
169) MICH. COMPoLAWS Sec. 15.362; HAW. REv. STAT. Sec. 378-62; R.I.GEN.
LAWS Sec. 36-15-3 ("about to report").
170) See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. Sec. 275-E:2 (a); R.I.GEN. LAWS Sec. 36-15-3
("causes to report").
171) LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 30:2027 (I); N.J. STAT. ANN. Sec. 34:19-3; N.Y. LAB.
LAW Sec. 740 (2) (a) ("threatens to disclose").
172) See CAL. LAB. CODE Sec. 1102.5 (b) (government and law enforcement agency);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 31-51m (b); HAW. REv. STAT. Sec. 378-62 (1); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 30:2027 A. (1); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, Sec. 833 (1);
MICH. COMPoLAWS Sec. 15.362; N.J. STAT. ANN. Sec. 34:19-3; N.Y. LAB. LAW Sec.
740 (2) (a); R.I.GEN. LAWS Sec. 36-15-1 ("public body" defined in the broadest sense);
MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.932 ("any government body or law enforcement officer");
IND. CODE ANN. Sec. 22-5-3-3 ("any person, agency or organization").
173) See CAL. LAB. CODE Sec. 1102.5 (b); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 31-5Im (b);
FLA. STAT. Sec. 112.3187 (1)-(10); HAW. REV. STAT. Sec. 378-62 (1); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, Sec. 833 (1) A. (covering in addition "condition or practice Ihat
would put at risk the safety and health oLany individual"); MICH. COMPoLAWS Sec.
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interpreted their respective statutes not to include violations of law which did not affect
the public, but only caused damages to the employer. 174 Several of the other statutes
contain various limitations. The Indiana statute, which is only applicable to public
contractors, restricts the protection to violations of law "concerning the execution of the
public contract." 175 New York requires that the violation "creates and presents a
substantial and specific dangerto the public health and safety. ,,176 The New York courts
interpret this provision narrowly. 177 Louisiana covers only violations of environmental
.
178 T ennessee protects repornng
.
Iaws, rnl es or regu 1anons.

I·
0 f· VIOallons
0f· Its

··1 or
CIVI

crinlinal code, federal law and "any regulation intended to protect the public health, safety
or welfare,',179 thus, however, including all environmental regulations. Ohio only covers
criminal offenses, either when they are likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm
to a person, creating a hazard to public health and safety, being a felony or resulting from
. I·
.. envrronmen tall aws. 180 F·illall y, th e 0regon statute covers reportIng
.
VIOallons
0f certam
181

crinlinal activity or causing others to report it.

The Montana statute covers violations

•
15.362; MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.932 Subd. (1) (a); N.H. REv. STAT. Sec. 275E:2; N.J. STAT. ANN. Sec. 34:19-3; OmoREv. CODE ANN. Sec. 4113.51; R.I.GEN.
LAWS Sec. 36-15-3.
174) See Vouch v. Carlson Companies, Inc., 439 N.W.2d 406 (Mich. App.1989),
review denied (internal theft and fraud in travel and expense accounts); Littman v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 715 F.Supp. 90 (1989) (internal fraud which affected
shareholding public only indirectly not covered) (New Jersey law).
175) IND. CODE ANN. Sec. 22-5-3-3 (a).
176) N.Y. LAB. LAW Sec. 740 (2) (a).
177) See Kern v. DePaul Mental Health Serv., Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 252,152 A.D.2d
957 (1989) (only dangers to public at large, danger for individual patient is not
sufficient); Lamagna v. New York State Ass'n for Help of Retarded Children, Inc., 551
N.Y.S.2d 556,158 A.D.2d 588 (no fiscal improprieties covered); Remba v. Federation
Employment and Guidance Serv., 76 N.Y.2d 801, 559 N.Y.S.2d 961,559 N.E.2d 655
(fraudulent billing not covered).
178) LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 30:2027 A. (1); see Cheramie v. J.Wayne Plaisance,
Inc., 595 So.2d 619 (Sup. 1992) (protection applies not only to violation of Lousiana
environmental act, but also to violations of federal and local laws).
179) TENN. CODE ANN. Sec. 50-1-304 (a) (b).
180) OmoREv. CODE ANN. Sec. 4113.51.
181) Sec. 659.550 (1) and (3).
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of public policy, public policy defined as a policy concerning the public health, safety and
182

welfare as established by statute.

The Minnesota statute contains the unique feature that no external recipient is allowed
to disclose the identity of the whistleblower unless he consents to it or the disclosure is
necessary for the prosecution of the wrongdoing. 183

bbb. Internal Whistleblowing
Internal whistleblowing is not only protected under several statutes,184 but seven of
them mandate prior intracorporate complaints when protection for subsequent external
whistleblowing is sought.

185

New York, New Jersey, New Hampshire and Maine require the employee to give
notice to a supervisor and to give the employer reasonable opportunity to correct the
wrong ·omg. 186H owever,m. M'alOe an dN ew H amps h'rre, sue h"notIce
d

IS

not necessary if

the employee has specific reasons to believe that it will not result in prompt correcting of
the wrongdoing.187 If the wrongdoing leads to an emergency and the employee is either
reasonably certain that the wrongdoing is known to a supervisor or where he reasonably
fears physical harm as a result of the notice, he may report directly externally under the
New Jersey statute.
Under the Indiana statute,188 the employee has to report to the employer first unless
the employer is the person who the employee believes is committing the violation. Even
then, the employee may report either to the employer, or to an agency entitled to a report
182) MONT. CODE ANN. Sec. 39-2-904 (1); Sec. 39-2-903 (7).
183) MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.932.
184) LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 30:2027 A. (1); N.J. STAT. ANN. Sec. 34:19-3; N.Y.
LAB. LAW Sec. 740 (2) (a) (to supervisor); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, Sec. 833 (1)
A., B.; MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.932 subd. (1) (a) (to employer).
185) New Jersey requires writing.
186) ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, Sec. 831; N.H. REV. STAT. Sec. 275-E:I; N.J.
STAT. ANN. Sec. 34:19-1; N.Y. LAB. LAW Sec. 740
187) ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, Sec. 831, see Bard V. Bath Iron Works Corp., 590
A.2d 152 (Me 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. Sec. 275-E:1.
188) IND. CODE ANN. Sec. 22-5-3-3.
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from the state ethics commission. Only when no good faith effort to correct the
wrongdoing is made within a reasonable time by the recipient, the employee may report to
any outsider. In Ohio, the employee is allowed to go externally when the employer does
not make a reasonable attempt to correct the wrongdoing within 24 hours after the
. 189
notIce.
On the other hand, under the clear language of several other statutes, only external
whistleblowing is protected. 190 Two others are silent on possible recipients. 191

ccc. Good Faith Allegations And Reasonable Belief
Under all statutes; the whistleblowing must be carried out in good faith. 192 When
whistleblowing is used for an improper purpose, even the reporting of true wrongdoing
cannot shield an employee from retaliation. Thus, in Wolcott v. Champion International
Corp.,193 an employee who was discharged after threatening management to expose the
violation of air pollution control laws unless he received an assurance regarding future job
security was held not protected. With regard to the content of the whistleblowing, most
statutes require a reasonable belief that the reported activities constitute violations of
law, 194 and some explicitly deny protection when the employee knows that his

189) OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Sec. 4113.51; compare Phung v. Wastes Managementt,
Inc., 40 Or.App.3d 130, 532 N.E.2d 195.
190) CAL. LAB. CODE Sec. 1102.5; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 31-51m; HAW.
REv. STAT. Sec. 378-61; MICH. COMPoLAWS Sec. 15.361; R.I. GEN. LAWS Sec. 3615-1; see Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (no protection of
internal whistleblowing); Westman, supra note 5, at 70-71; Lofgren, supra note 21, at
331-32.
191) OR. REv. STAT. Sec. 659.550; TENN. CODE ANN. Sec. 50-1-304.
192) See, e.g., LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 30:2027 A.; MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.932
subd. (1) (a); N.H. REv. STAT. Sec. 275-E:2; OR. REv. STAT. Sec. 659.550 (1); see
Melchi V. Bums Intern. Sec. Servs., Inc., 597 F.Supp. 575 (D.C. 1984) (Michigan
law); Phipps V. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (1987) (Minnesota).
193) 691 F.Supp. 1052, 1059 (W.D. Mich 1987) (extortion clearly not the conduct
statute wanted to encourage); see Lofgren, supra note 21, at 334.
194) CAL. LAB. CODE Sec. 1102.5 (b); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 30:2027 A. (1); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, Sec. 831 (I); N.H. REv. STAT. Sec. 275-E:I; N.J. STAT.
ANN. Sec. 34:19-3 (a); R.I. GEN. LAWS Sec. 36-15-3; see Melchi, 597 F.Supp. at 575
(in view of pervasive regulation of nuclear power industry reasonable to believe that
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allegations are false. 195 Some statutes even apply a negligence standard, requiring either
. "reckless disregaro,,196 or "reason to know,,197 of the falsity of the allegations.
Under the Ohio and Indiana statutes, the employee is obliged to make a reasonable
. th e accuracy
attempt to de temune

0f'of'
any 1

ormation h e reports. 198

cc. Discriminatory Conduct And Motive
As Tennessee and Montana 199 only cover discharges, the language of most of the
other statutes coyers in addition any discrimination "regarding compensation, terms,
200

conditions, location, or privileges of employment" in response to the whistleblowing.

With regard to the discriminatory motive, some courts allocate the burden of proof in
cases under the state whistleblower statutes differently from cases under the federal
environmental whistleblower laws. Although the requirements for stating a prima facie
case,201 showing valid business reasons and "pretext" are essentially the same,202 these
destruction and falsification of reports and records violaton oflaw); Bard v. Bath Iron
Works Corp., 590 A.2d 152 (Me 1991).
195) CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 31-51m (b); HAW. REv. STAT. Sec. 378-62 (1);
IND. CODE ANN. Sec. 22-5-3-3 (c); MrCH. COMPoLAWS Sec. 15.362; MINN. STAT.
ANN. Sec. 181.932 Subd. (2).
196) MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.932 Subd. (2).
197) R.I. GEN. LAWS Sec. 36-15-3.
198) IND. CODE ANN. Sec. 22-5-3-3 (c); Omo REv. CODE ANN. Sec. 4113.51.
199) TENN. CODE ANN. Sec. 50-1-304; MONT. CODE ANN. Sec. 39-2-904 (1); MONT.
CODE ANN. Sec. 39-2-903 (1), (2).
200) See FLA. STAT. Sec. 112.3187 (1)-(10); HAW. REv. STAT. Sec. 378-61; IND.
CODE ANN. Sec. 22-5-3-3 (b); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, Sec. 833 (1); MrcH.
COMPoLAWS Sec. 15.362; MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.932 Subd. (1); N.H. REv.
STAT. Sec. 275-E:2; N.J. STAT. ANN. Sec. 34:19-3; N.Y. LAB. LAW Sec. 740 (2);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. Sec. 4113.51; OR. REv. STAT. Sec. 659.550 (1); R.I. GEN.
LAWS Sec. 36-15-3; the language of the California, Connecticut and Lousiana statutes is
broader, see CAL. LAB. CODE Sec. 1102.5 (b) ("retaliate"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
Sec. 31-51m (b) ("penalize"); LA. crV. CODEANN. art. 30:2027 B. ("any action").
201) See Littman V. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 715 F.Supp. 90 (1987) (NJ.law);
Kern V. DePaul Mental Health Servs., Inc., 139 Misc.2d 970, 529 N.Y.S.2d 265, affd
152 A.D.2d 957,544 N.Y.S.2d 252, appeal denied 74 N.Y.2d 615,549 N.Y.S.2d 960,
549 N.E.2d 151; Hopkins V. City of Midland, 158 Mich.App. 361,404 N.W.2d 744;
Michaelson V. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174, affd 479 NW.2d 58
(Minn. 1991); Tyma V. Adamo, Inc., 159 Mich.App. 592, 407 N.W.2d 47 (1987).
202) See Wolcott V. Champion Int. Corp., 691 F.Supp. 1052 (W.O. Mich. 1987)
(Michigan Law); Eckstein v. Kuhn, 160 Mich.App. 240, 408 N.W.2d 131 (1987).
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has to pursue administrative proceedings if the government agency he is reporting to
provl'd"es lor suc h210
.
In Maine, the employee has fIrst to bring a complaint before the Maine Human Rights
Commission, which, after investigating and attempting to settle the dispute, may fIle a
civil action in court. However, if neither a settlement agreement is reached nor suit is
brought by the Commission within 180 days after the complaint, the employee may, after
obtaining a right-to-sue-letter

211

from the commission, sue himself.

Similarily, the

Oregon statute p~ovides for a complaint with the commissioner of labor, who may assess
a civil fIne and who must try to settle the dispute within one year. Thereafter, the
212

employee can bring a civil action on his own.

Under the Montana Wrongful

Discharge Act, an employee is required to exhaust internal procedures maintained by the
employer and laid down in writing before bringing a claim in court, unless the
proceedings are not completed within 90 days or the employer did not notify the
213

employee of the existance of these proceedings within 7 days after the discharge.

Furthermore, each party can make an offer to arbitrate within 60 days after service of the
complaint. If the other part rejects this offer and the offeror prevails in court, the other
part is liable to reasonable attorney's fees for the litigation. If the employee's offer is
accepted, the employer has to pay all costs of arbitration in case the employee
preVal'1s. 214

210)
211)
212)
213)
214)

Dworkin & Near, supra note 8, at 247-248
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, Sec. 834-A, tit.5 Sec. 4612.
OR. REv. STAT. Sec. 659.550.
MONT. CODE ANN. Sec. 39-2-911 (2).
MONT. CODE ANN. Sec. 39-2-914 (amended in 1993).
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bb. Remedies
With regard to the available remedies, there is considerable variety among the different
statutes. Some are limited to equitable remedies,215 while others allow only actual
..
d amages, 216 or. both 217 Onl y three state statutes proVI'd e exp IiCl·tl"y lor pumnve
damages,2l8 including Montana, which requires clear and convincing evidence that the
219

discharge was actually fraudulous or actually malicious.

Under some statutes, civil

fmes or other penalties may be assessed. 220 Finally, most statutes provide for recovery
···
. 1udi ng attorney ."s lees. 221
of 1Inganon
costs, mc
Equitable re~edies may include injunctive relief, reinstatement, back pay,222 fringe
benefits and seuiority rights. Actual damages may include damages for non-economic
losses, such as emotional distress or career difficulties resulting from being known as a
"troublemaker.,,223 However, Montana restricts damages to lost wages and fringe
benefits for at the most 4 years and denies explicitly damages for emotional distress and

215) CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 3l-5lm (c); N.Y. LAB. LAW Sec. 740, see Scaduto
v. Restaurant Assoc.s Industries, Inc, 180 A.D.2d 458,579 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1992);
N.H. REv. STAT. Sec. 275-E:4 (through commissioner only).
216) TENN. CODE ANN. Sec. 50-1-304.
217) MICH. COMPoLAWS Sec. 15.364; HAW. REv. STAT. Sec. 378-63; Sec. 378-64;
R.I. GEN. LAWS Sec. 36-15-5; MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.935; N.J. STAT. ANN.
Sec. 34:19-5; LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 30:2027 B. (29 (b).
218) LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 30:2027 B. (1), (2) (triple the actual damages), see
Cheramie v. J.Wayne Plaisance, Inc., 595 So.2d 619 (Sup.1992); N.J. STAT. ANN.
Sec. 34:19-5 (f); the Indiana, California and Tennessee statute allow civil actions without
mentioning the kind of damages, see IND. CODEANN. Sec. 22-5-3-3 (c); CAL. LAB.
CODE Sec. 1102.5; TENN. CODE ANN. Sec. 50-1-304.
219) MONT. CODE ANN. Sec. 39-2-905 (2).
220) E.g. HAW. REv. STAT. Sec. 378-65; MICH. COMPoLAWS Sec. 15.365; N.J.
STAT. ANN. Sec. 34:19-5 (g); MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.936.
221) See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 31-51m (c); FLA. STAT. Sec. 112.3187 (1)(10); HAW. REv. STAT. Sec. 378-64; LA. aV. CODE ANN. art. 30:2027 B.(I); MICH.
COMPoLAWS Sec. 15.364; MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.936, see Piekarski v. Home
Owners Sav. Bank F.S.B., 752 F.Supp. 1451, on subsequent appeal, 956 F.2d 1484,
cert. denied 113 S.Ct. 206,121 L.Ed.2d 147 (D.Minn. 1990) (award within discretion
of court); N.J. STAT. ANN. Sec. 34:19-5 (e); N.Y. LAB. LAW Sec. 740 (5) (e); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. Sec. 4113.51; R.I. GEN. LAWS Sec. 36-15-5; but see MONT. CODE
ANN. Sec. 39-2-914 (following American rule if not arbitration offer).
222) See to recoverable back and front pay Piekarski, 752 F.Supp. at 1451.
223) Barnett, supra note 41, at 447.
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224

pain and suffering.

ln

order to discourage unfounded whistleblowing protection

claims, the New'York, New Jersey and Tennesse statutes allow the court to impose the
225

employer's reasonable litigation expenses on the whistleblower.

c. Notification
Some states require the employer to post a notice or otherwise notify his employees
about their rights and obligations under the statute.226 Violations of the notice
..
. '1·fimeso227
requIrements
are pums h abl e by CIVl

d. Civil Fines
. 1 .
. '1 fimeso228 H awal.229 an d
are su b'~ect to CIVI
U nd er seve ral 0f t he statutes, VIOatJons
Michigan230 provide for a fine of $ 500,- for each violation, while in New Jersey the
first violation will be fined $ 1.000,-, and each subsequent violation $ 5.000,_.231 In
Maine?32

the employer has to pay $ 10,- for each day of wilful violation, in

Minnesota233 $ 25,- per day up to a total of $ 750,-

4. Protection By Criminal Law
There is no law directly aimed at making harassment or intimidation of whistleblowing
a crime. Although conspiracies to intimidate government informants are criminally

224) MONT. CODE ANN. Sec. 39-2-905.
225) N.J. STAT. ANN. Sec. 34:19-6; N.Y. LAB. LAW Sec. 740 (6) ("without basis in
law or fact"); TENN. CODEANN. Sec. 50-1-304 (e) (2) (when suit for improper
purposes, "such as to harass or to cause needless increase in cost to the employer").
226) See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, Sec. 839; HAW. REv. STAT. Sec. 378-68.
227) See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, Sec. 836 ($ 10,- for each day of wilful
violation); HAW. REv. STAT. Sec. 378-68 (up to $ 500,- ).
228) IND. CODE ANN. Sec. 22-5-3-3 (c) (class A infraction).
229) HAW. REv. STAT. Sec. 378-65.
230) MICH. CaMP. LAWS Sec. 15.365.
231) N.J. STAT. ANN. Sec. 34:19-5 (g).
232) ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, Sec. 836.
233) MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.936.
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punishable under federal law ,234 it seems that this provision has so far not been utilized
to protect employee whistleblowers against retaliation, and it seems fair to say that "it is
unrealistic to expect the U.S. Department of Justice to prosecute anything but the most
outrageous criminal harassment of a whistleblower .••235 Therefore, criminal law has no
potential to protect whistleblowers.

II. DISINCENTIVES TO ENVIRONMENTAL WHISTLEBLOWING
Environmen¥

law is not only subject to employment law, but, as any human

behavior, to the general rules the legal system imposes on everybody.

A. MANDATORY WHISTLEBLOWING?
The employment contract or work instructions may oblige an employee to report
wrongdoing internally. However, as the information is requested by the employer, it will
be very unlikely that he will react adversely when the employee provides it. Furthermore,
there is no law requiring an employee to report violations of environrnentallaw.236

The

only exception are the code of conduct for physicians and attorneys, which impose a duty
to report misconduct of fellow professionals to the appropriate internal or external
237

authorities.

However, although not observing the duty may result in revocation of the

234) 18 U.S.c. Sec. 241; see U.S. v.Smith, 623 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1980); Kohn
& Kohn, supra note 44, at 31.
235) Kohn & Kohn, supra note 44, at 31.
236) Neither the crimes of misprision of felony nor of compounding crimes punish the
mere failure to report, see Note (Merek Evan Lipson), Compounding Crimes: Time for
Enforcement?, 27 HASTINGSL.J. 175,203 (1975); WAYNER. LAFAVE & AUSTINW.
SCOTI JR., SUBSTANTIVECRIMINALLAW (vol. 2) 175 (1986); see MODEL PENAL
CODE Sec. 208.32A, Comment at 203 (Tent. Draft No.9, 1959); compare the famous
quotation in Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. 556,5 L.Ed. 522 (1822) ("it may be the duty
of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to proclaim every offense which comes to his
knowledge; ... the law which would punish him in every case for not performing this
duty is too harsh for man").
237) For lawyers, see MODEL RULESOF PROFESSIONALCONDUCTRules 8.3 (a), 8.4;
for physicians see PRINCIPLESOFMEDICALETHICSANDCURRENTOPINIONSOF THE
COUNCILOF ETHICALANDJUDICIALAFFAIRS,Rule 9.04 (American Medical
Association 1989).
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license to practice,238 the restriction to fellow professionals minimizes the practical
linportanceoftlUsduty.

B. DISINCENTIVES TO WHISTI..EBLOWING
The employment contract as well as general tort law create disincentives for
environmental whistleblowing.

1. Contractual qability
Implied in every employment contract239 are the duties of an employee to obey all
reasonable orders,240 to act solely for the benefit of the employer with regard to his
.
.
emp 1oyment, 241 an d not to use or to communicate
gene ra11y u nkn own 242. illf ormation
acquired during the employment to the injury of the principal. These duties of obedience,
loyalty and confidentiality may be supplemented by an explicit confidentiality agreement.
243

Violations of these duties make an employee liable for damages.

238) see for physicians e.g. Forziati v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 333 Mass.
125, 128 N.E.2d 789 (1955); Bell v. Board of Regents, 295 N.Y. 101,65 N.E.2d 184
(1952); for lawyers seeln re Himmel, 125 m.2d 531,533 N.E.2d 790 (1988)
(Suspension for one year); Matter of Dowd, 160 A.D.2d 78, 559 N.Y.2d 365, appeal
denied, 76 N.Y.2d 710,564 N.E.2d 672,563 N.Y ..2d 62 (1990) (suspension for five
years); Seymour Moskovitz, Employment-at-will & Professional Ethics: The
Professional's Dilemma, 23 VAL. ULREv. 33, 60 (1988).
239) See HAROLDGILLREUSClll..EIN& WILLIAMA. GREGORY,THE LAW OF AGENCY
ANDPAR1NERSHIP124 (2d ed. 1990); Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and
the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA.
L.REv. 279,280 (1971); Westman, supra note 5, at 23; HOWARDA. SPECTER &
MAITHEW W. FINKIN,INDIVIDUALEMPLOYMENTLAW ANDLITIGATION539, 543,
(1989).
240) RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF AGENCYSec. 385 (1958-84); Specler & Finkin,
supra note, at 539.
241) See REsTATEMENT(SECOND)OF AGENCYSec. 387 (1958-84); Specter & Finkin,
supra note 239, at 543.
242) See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF AGENCYSEC. 395 (1958-84).
243) See Reuschlein & Gregory, supra note 239, at 130.
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As internal whistleblowing is neither disloyal nor a breach of confidentiality,244
external whistleblowing may violate both the implied duties and an explicit confidentiality
provision when the allegations are false.
True allegations do not constitute a breach of the implied duties. The Restatement
(Second) of Agency lists "business and professional ethics" as a factor to determine the
reasonablenes of an order,245 and excludes illegal or unethical acts from the duty of
obedience. Although the right not to perform illegal acts does not imply a right to disclose
such acts or not ~ocomply with an order of the employer not to disclose,246 the reference
to ethical standards as well as the privileges from all of the implied duties when acting in
the protection of superior interests of others, such as revealing a planned crime,247 show

244) Compare Greene v. Hawaian Dredging Co., 26 Cal.2d 245, 157 P.2d 367,370
(right to protest regarding working conditions); Specter & Finkin, supra note 239, at 542-

43; On the contrary, reporting internally is to a limited extent required under the duty of
loyalty. Although courts have not directly taken a position whether an employee has a
duty to disclose violations of law, decisions in other agent-principal relationships seem to
support a limited duty when the information is related to the specific activity the agent
carries out for the principal, and the agent is either the only one in possesion of the
information or has specific expertise to evaluate information the principal has not. Appliee
to the employment context, the duty of loyalty would then only require the reporting of
illegal conduct relating to the respective job duties of which the employer is not aware.
Thus, a low-level employee would be only responsible for reporting illegal conduct in his
individual workspace, whereas a supervisor's and manager's duty to report would
encompass their respective field of responsibility, see Monty v. Peterson, 85 Wash.2d
956,540 P.2d 1377, 1381 (1975); Lindland v. United Business lnvs, 298 Or. 318,693
P.2d 20, 23 (1984); Rodriguez v. Cardona Travel Bureau, 216 N.J. Super. 226, 523
A.2d 281 (1986). This result seems to be in accord with the view of some of the courts
denying protection against retaliatory discharge, see Smith v. Calgon Carbon Co., 917
F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal complaint about toxic chemicals leak not protected
when employee's job did not include protecting against or investigation of such leaks).
245) See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF AGENCYSec. 385, Comment a (1958-84).
246) See Blumberg, supra note 239, at 284; Westman, supra note 5, at 23.
247) RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF AGENCYSec. 385 (2); Sec. 387, Comment b; the
comment states that an employee is not "necessarily prevented from acting in good faith
outside his employment in a manner which injuriously affects his principal's business".
As an illustration, the Comment allows an employee of a life insurance to advocate
legislation which would require a change in the policies issued by his employer.
However, with regard to specific information acquired during his employment, the
employee is not allowed to disclose, see Blumberg, supra note 239, at 285; Comment f.
to Sec. 395 asserts that an employee may reveal confidential information "in the
protection of "a superior interest of himself or of a third person. Thus, if the confidential
information is to the effect that the principal is committing or about to commit a crime, tI

43
that the authors of the Restatement obviously did not want to construe the implied duties
248

to protect or further illegal behavior.

Pursuant with this fInding, courts and other

authority249 allow disclosures in the public interest with regard to several other principal·
hi ps. 250
agent re 1attons
ConfIdentiality agreements are phrased in general terms and will never explicitly cover
251

illegal conduct They are interpreted inter alia

in the light of the purpose both parties

..... provlSlons m stan dardized agreements are gener all y construe d
assen ted to. 252 R estncttve
.
. tak en mto
.
.
agamst
th e draft er, 253 an d th e pu bli··c mterest IS
account w h en c h·oosmg
'
.
254 Th e purpose
posS!'bl'e mterpretatIons.
be tween diftierent

0 fl'an

. Iu di ng a
emp oyer s mc

confIdentiality clause in an employment contract or another agreement is not, at least not
from the viewpoint of the employee, to cover up possible illegal behavior. An employee
legitimately can - and will - expect that illegal behavior will not occur in the fIrm. Thus,
he legitimately understands a confIdentiality clause not to include illegal acts. As this
interpretation limits the restrictive confIdentiality provision to the detriment of the drafter,
agent is under no duty not to reveal it"; compare Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 39, at
387 n.197 (obviouslly assuming that crime and illegal act are identical).
248) See Blumberg, supra note 239, at 288 (questioning usefulness of Restatement's
economic approach to the problem of the relationship between employee's obligations as
a citizen and his role as employee).
249) See Initial Servs., Ltd. v. Putteril, 3 W.L.R. 1032,84 L.Q.Rev. 8 (1968)
(England) (disclosure of at least unlawful acts to government authorites no breach of
confIdentiality); Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 39, at 388; Westman, supra note 5, at
24 obviously assumes that disclosure of all illegal acts does not constirute a breach
(""privilege to disclose criminal activities does not necessarily extend to disclosures of
unethical behavior"); see also Blumberg, supra note 239, at 297 (pointing out that tort law
introduces consideration of societal interest).
250) Problems of breach of confIdentiality mainly occur in the public employeeemployer, the atrorney-client, physician-patient and bank-customer relationships, see
Note (Alan B. Vickery), Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L.REv.
1426 (1982).
251) See to the principles of contract interpretation ALLANF. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS, Sec. 7 (1990).
252) Id. at 513 (1990); see Corino Civetta Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 67 N.Y.2d
297,493 N.E.2d 905 (1986).
253) See Farnsworth, supra note 251, at 310, 315; North Gate Corp. v. Nat'l Food
Stores, 30 Wis.2d 317,140 N.W.2d 744 (1966) ("where various meanings can be given
a term, the term is to be strictly construed against the draftsman of the contract").
254) COMPAREFarnsworth, supra note 251, at 519; Altlanta Ctr. Ltd. v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 848 F.2d 146 (11th Cir. 1988).
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and furthennore serves the public interest, courts are likely to interpret confidentiality
clauses in a way!not to include environmental whistleblowing when the allegations are
true.
Therefore, false allegations to government authorities may subject the employee to
liability for the resulting damages. Although these damages can be substantial, cases in
which an employer sued under this cause of action are not reported. For the jurisdictions
recognizing either statotory or common law whistleblower protection, this may be
explained by the fact that imposing contractua1liability would be incongruent with the
protection against discharge and harassment for good faith reporting. However, such
contract claims may be succesful in jurisdictions not providing for whistleblower
protection. Thus, the potential liability serves as a disincentive for environmental
whistleblowing.

2. Tort Liability
Among the theories the employer, or a co-employee named responsible for the
perceived illegal conduct, may try to utilize to recover damages from the
whistleblower,255 a tort action for defamation has the most potential.
Defamation256 provides a remedy for statements impairing the reputation of both
individuals and business associations.257 Elements for an action are (1) a false and
defamatory statement of fact258 concerning another person, which is (2) without a
255) Depending on the facts, actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress, false
imprisonment, tortious interference with economic advantage and for malicious
prosecution are possible.
256) An action for libel concerns basically written, for slander oral communications.
Slander requires proof of special damages, i.e. loss of something which has economic or
pecuniary value and results from the harm to the reputation, see W. PAGEKEETONET
AL., PROSSERAND KEETONON THE LAW OF TORTS 793 (5th ed. 1984)
257) RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFTORTS 561,562 (1977); Prosser & Keeton, supra
note 256, at 778-779.
258) Stating an opinion is not actionable; however, if and to the extent the opinion implies
the assertion of facts, it might be, see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S.Ct. 2695,
III L.Ed.l (1990); to defamatory opinions compare Prosser & Keeton, supra note 256,
Sec. Il3A.
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privilege (3) intentionally or negligently published to a third party (4) and results in
259

darnages.

Internal whistleblowing may directly or indirectly accuse a co-employee with violating
the law, or at least with violating his job duties. This, as well as reporting perceived
illegal conduct externally to government authorities, tends to lower the respective
recipient's estimation of the person or organization responsible, and thus constitutes a
defamatory statement.260 As whistleblowing, by definition, seeks either management or
government authority to take notice of and correct the alleged wrongdoing, the statement
..
IS

. all y to tern.
h
261
commumca ted"mtenUon

H owever, thall'
e egauons h ave to be fal se262

to constitute an action for defamation. Reporting true violations of environmental law
does not subject a whistleblower to liability for defamation. But even when the allegations
are false, the majority view grants a qualified privilege for environmental
. 263
w h·IS tl e bl owmg.
With regard to internal whistleblowing, statements made to protect the recipient's or a
third party's interest are privileged if the publisher has a legal or moral duty to protect
these interests, or when the reporting reflects "generally accepted standards of decent

259) RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFTORTS Sec. 558 (1977).
260) See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS Sec. 559 (1977); communication
third person is sufficient, SEEProsser & Keeton, supra note 256, at 798-799.

to one

261) Intent in torts means desire to cause a consequence, or belief that this consequence is
substantially certain to occur, see RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF TORTS Sec. 8A (1977).
262) See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 256, at Sec. 116; RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF
TORTS Sec. 581A Comment a (1977).
263) A minority of courts grants an absolute privilege for participants in judicial and
"quasi-judicial" proceedings, even before the proceedings have commenced, covering
actively volunteered statements to law enforcement or other public officials, especially
when the statements are intended to initiate judicial proceedings, see, e.g. General E1ec.
Co. v. Sargent & Lundy, 916 F.2d 1119, 1125-27 (6th Cir. 1990) (Kentucky law); Cutts
v. American United Life Ins. Co., 505 So.2d 1211, 1215 (Ala. 1987); Ducosin v. Mott,
292 Or. 764, 642 P.2d 1168, 1169-70 (1982); Williams v. Taylor, 129 Cal.App.3d 745,
181 Cal.Rptr. 423 (1982); Prosser & Keeton, supra note 256, at 819-20; Bieluch v.
Smith, 1993 WL 190841 (letter complaining about state trooper to commissioner for
Public Safety); Ganim v. Bridgeport Hydraulics Co., 1993 WL 541005 (complaint about
petrol discharge to Conn. Dept. of Env. Protection); Vantassell-Matin v. Nelson, 741
F.Supp 698 (N.D.Ill. 1990).
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conduct ,,264 Courts have recognized that the employment relationship justifies
statements to the employer about a fellow employee,265 especially when the purpose of
the statement is to warn the employer of misconduct. 266 Closely related are privileged
statements which are made to protect a common interest of the publisher and the recipient,
and where the publisher reasonably believes that the recipient is entitled to such
information.267 Such a common interest is acknowledged for communications between
employees among themselves,268 e.g. between employee and supervisor, as well as for
269

statements betwgen employee and employer.

The future existence of the firm

constitutes such a common interest, and violations of environmental law may endanger it
because of the substantial financial losses or revocation of necessary licenses it may
.
270
mcur.

264) Prosser & Keeton, supra note 256, at 827; RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS
Sec. 595 (1977).
265) See, e.g., Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 211 S.c. 167,44 S.E.2d 328 (1947) (theft);
Lee v. Cannon Mills, 107 F.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1939) (theft); Kevin T. Baine & Chad E.
Milton, Common Law Privileges For Defamatory Communications, in Libel Litigation
1992,9 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. G4-3883, 1992), available in Westlaw 338; Prosser & Keeton, supra note
256, at 827.
266) See Cochran v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 72 Ga.App. 458, 34 S.E.2d 296 (nurse
reporting disease); Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 Ill.2d 345, 243 N.E.2d 217
(1969); Prosser & Keeton, supra note 256, at 827 n.27-28.
267) See Bolden v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 765 F.Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Baine &
Milton, supra note 265, at 9; Prosser & Keeton, supra note 256, at 830.
268) See Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 697 F.Supp. 1377 (M.D.Pa. 1986); compare
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF TORTS Sec. 596 Comment c (1977); Prosser & Keeton,
supra note 256, at 828-29; Baine & Milton, supra note 265, at 9.
269) See Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1990) (Arkansas Law); Taylor v.
Houston Lighting & Power Co., 756 F.Supp. 297 (S.D.Tex. 1990); Hunt v. Univ. of
Minnesota, 465 N.W.2d 88 (Minn.App. 1991); DeLeon v. St.Josephs Hosp., Inc., 871
F.2d 1229 (4th Cir. 1989) (Maryland Law), cert. denied 493 U.S. 825 (1989) (physician
reporting about fellow physician to hospital credential committee); Baine & Milton, supra
note 265, at 9.
270) It could be further argued that individual exposed to environmental pollution or
hazards form a group with a common interest, including the employer and the employee,
compare Prosser & Keeton, supra note 256, at 830 (also "members of a group with a
common interest of non-pecuniary character").
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External environmental whistleblowing is protected under the qualified privilege for
statements aimed at safeguarding the public interest 271 A statement is privileged as long
as there are reasonable grounds on the part of the publisher to believe that his statement
contains information affecting an important public interest, and the recipient is a public
officer "authorized ... to take action if the defamatory action is true,,,272 Thus, not only
statements regarding criminal activity273 are covered. Communications made in service
of the public interest in effective law enforcement, 274 at least when made to law

"
enlorcement

5 are gene rall··y pnv il eg ed .

0 ffiICials , 27

However, ab~se can override the qualified privilege.276 The most important basis to
deny the privilege is when the whistleblower does not believe in the truth of the
statement. 277 Although courts differ regarding the standard of fault necessary to defeat
the privilege,278 most279 follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts280 and apply the
271) See Baine & Milton, supra note 265, at 10; Prosser & Keeton, supra note 256, at
830-3l.
272) RESTA1EMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS Sec. 598 (1977); Baine & Milton, supra note
265, at 10.
273) SEE RESTA1EMENT(SECOND)OF TORTS Sec. 598 Comment d (1977); Hutchinson
v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 350 Mass. 188,76 N.E.2d 57 (1966) (bomb threat);
Prosser & Keeton, supra note 256, at 830.
274) See, e.g., Catrone v. Thoroughbred Racing Assoc., 929 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1991)
(Mass. law); Rodriguez v. Clark Color Labs, 732 F.Supp. 279 (D. Puerto Rico), affd
921 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1990); Baine & Milton, supra note 265, at 10.
275) See Hardge-Harris v. Pleban, 741 F.Supp. 764 (E.D.Mo.1990), affd mem., 938
F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1991); Rodriguez v. Clark Color Labs, 732 F.Supp. 279 (D. Puerto
Rico), affd, 921 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1990); Prosser & Keeton on torts, supra note 256, at
830 ("proper authorities"); Baine & Milton, supra note 265, at 10.
276) See RESTA1EMENT(SECOND)OF TORTS Sec. 593, Sec. 258; Baine Milton, supra
note 265, at 7; Prosser & Keeton, supra note 256, at 8
277) See Russell v. Geis, 251 Cal.App.2d 560,50 Cal.Rptr. 569 (1967); Caldwell v.
Personal Fin. Co. of St. Petersburg, 46 So.2d 726 (Aa.1950); Prosser & Keeton, supra
note 256, at 834.
278) Some courts require common law malice, i.e. ill will, spite, absence of good faith or
desire to harm the person defamed to defeat the privilege, see Clark v. America's First
Credit Union, 585 So.2d 1367 (Ala. 1991); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Zalay,
581 So.2d 178 (Fla.App.), rev. denied, 591 So.2d 185 (Aa 1991); Stuempges v. Park,
Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980); Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc. 812 P.2d 49
(Utah 1991); Haueter v. Publ. Co., 811 P.2d 231 (Wash.App.1991), while others apply
a neglicence standardsee, see e.g. Rouly v. Enserch Corp., 835 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir.
1988) (Lousiana); Cooper v. Portland Gen'l Elec. Corp., 824 P.2d 1152 (Or. Ct. App.
1992); Tibke v. McDougal, 479 N.W.2d 848 (S.D. 1992) contra Prosser & Keeton,
supra note 256, at 835, while still others develop their own standard outside these
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"actual malice" standard developed by the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan
and its progeny}81

Under this standard, a private plaintiffs282 such as the employer or a

fellow employee must show "actual malice,,283 to recover presumed or punitive damages
when the statement, such as environmental whistleblowing, adressed a matter of public
concern. "Actual Malice" means that the defendant either knew that his statement was
false and that it defames plaintiff, or that he acted in reckless disregard of this matter. 284
Therefore, a whistleblower who does not positively know that his statement is false and
who does not have serious doubts about its truth285 is shielded by the qualified privilege.

categories, see Babb v. Minder 806 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1986) (Illinois has merged actual
and cornmon law malice); see Baine & Milton, supra note 265, at 8.
279) Miller v. Danville Elks Lodge, 569 N.E.2d 1160 (Ill.App 1991); DeLeon v. St.
John Hosp., Inc., 871 F.2d 1229 (4th Cir.) (Md. law), cert. denied 493 U.S. 825
(1989); Boden v. Anaconda Minerals Co., 757 F.Supp 848 (S.D. Ohio 1990); Baggs v.
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. 750 F.Supp. 264 (W.D.Mich. 1990), affd, 957 F.2d 268 (6th
Cir. 1992); Green Acres v. London, 688 P.2d 617 (Ariz. 1984); Bratt v. ffiM Corp.,
467 N.E.2d 126 (Mass.1984); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel PubI.Co., 516 A.2d 220
(N.J. 1986); Baine & Milton, supra note 265, at 8.
280) Sec. 600.
281) New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686,
motion denied 376 U.S. 967, 84 S.Ct. 1130, 12 L.Ed.2d 83 (1964); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593
(1985); see compilation of Supreme court cases since New York times at David A.
Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U.PENN.L.REv. 487, 488 (1991);
some courts have interpreted Gertz, id., to restrict the fault requirement only to media
defendants, see Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis.2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141, cert. denied 459
U.S. 883, 103 S.Ct. 179,74 L.Ed.2d 147. However, the Supreme Court seems to make
no distinction between media and non-media defendants, see Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S.
at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting, concluding that six justices agree that there is no
distincition); Prosser & Keeton, supra note 256, Supp. at 109 n.18.
282) The court distinguishes whether the plaintiff is a "public figure", i.e. somebody who
does not hold a public office, but is "nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of
important public questions or, by reason of (his) fame, shape(s) events in areas of
concern to society at large", see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164
(Warren, J. concurring in the result); Anderson, supra note 281, at 500. The Court
requires a showing of "actual malice" to recover presumed damages. Although some large
employers might be characterized as "public figures", the vast majority as well as the
whistleblower's fellow employees are not.
283) Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349; Anderson, supra note 281, at 501.
284) See New York Times. 376 U.S. at 254.
285) See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-733 (1968); Anderson, supra note
281, at 493.
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rn. INTERRELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN THE SOURCES OF WHISTLEBLOWER

LAW
The relationship between the three sources of whistleblower protection law, federal
statute, state statute and common law, as well as their relationship to employer or coemployee claims under state tort or contract law is largely unclear.

A. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW?
State law is preempted by federallaw when Congress either explicitly provided for it,
indicated an intent to occupy an entire field of regulation, or the state law actually conflicts
with federal law. Such a conflict exists when compliance with both laws is impossible, or
when the state law stands as an obstacle to the purpose and objective congtess wanted to
achieve by enacting the federallaw.286

However, especially in fields like environmental

protection and labor relations287 which are traditionally dominated by the states,288 "the
exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed. ,,289

Under this standard,

state whistleblower protection law is not preempted even when a federal remedy is
'1 bl e.290
aVIDa

286) Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461,
469, 104 S.Ct. 2518,2523, 81 L.Ed.2d 399 (1983) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 245.
287) See Kohn & Kohn 105; De Canas v. Bica, 96 S.Ct. 933, 937 (1976); see J. Renz,
The Effect of Federal Legislation on Historical State Powers of Pollution Control: Has
Congress Muddied State Waters?, 43 MONT. L.REv. 197 (1982).
288) English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275, 110
L.Ed.2d 65 (1990).
289) Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199,203 (1952); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 98
S.Ct. 988, 994 (1978) ("clear and manifest purpose of congtess" necessary to assume
preemption).
290) see Kohn & Kohn, supra note 44, at 105-07; in Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d
1160 (5th Cir. 1988), the court implied that there is at least no general preemption for the
CAA, WCPA, SDW A, SWDA; see also Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 396
N.W.2d 588 (Minn.Ct. App. 1986), affd, 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987) (no preemption by CAA); but see Braun v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 635 F.Supp. 75 (E.D.Pa 1986)
(preemption for TSCA, but before ERA amendment); the Montana whistleblower statute
explicitly does not apply to discharges for which a federal statute provides a procedure
such as filing complaints with an administrative body, MONT. CODE Sec. 39-2-912 (1).
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None of the federal environmental statutes explicitly preempts state law. On the
contrary, the use of the tenn "may ...file a complaint" implies that Congress wanted to

al protectIon,
. but not man date It
. 291
penmt. fi"..l
<Oller
In 1993, Congress showed its clear intent not to occupy the entire field of
environmental whistleblowinl92

by amending the Energy Reorganization Act.

..
.
among courts, 293 C ongress exp IiCI'tJ y expresse d Its
R espon di ng to a sp Iit 0f opIDlon
intent not to preempt state whistleblower law in the field of the most extensive federal
legislation, and thus allows the conclusion that the other federal environmental
whistleblower p~ovisions do not preempt state remedies as well. 294 There are no hints to
the contrary in the legislative history of the statutes,295 and at the time of the enactment
of the federal statutes, a broad body of whistleblower common law already existed.
Finally, state and federal law are not in conflict, and the congressional purpose of
296

preventing employers from silencing environmental concems

is best served by giving

employees both a federal and a state track of protection. 297
However, it is not clear whether state tort or contract law claims by the employer or a
co-employee against the whistleblower are preempted as well. Such claims are not
covered by the federal statutes,298 and there are no indications in the language or
legislative history that Congress wanted to bar them.
291) See Norris v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 881 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1989); all
of the federal statutes except the ERA contain a general clause allowing more stringent
state action in the regulated field, see Kohn & Kohn, supra note 44, at 117 n.26.
292) Several Courts point out that whistleblower statutes are not directly concerned with
environmental protection in the respective field, but are primarily concerned with
protecting whistleblowers, see Norris, 881 F.2d at 1144; Ackinson v. Detroit Edison
Co., 751 F.Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1990); Bordell v. General Elec. Co., 164 A.d.2d
497,564 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1990).
293) see Gregory G. Sarno, Federal Pre-emption of Whistle blower's State-law Action
for Wrongful Retaliation, 99 A.L.R. FED. 775 (1990).
294) Compare Peter A. Kraus, 1990-1991 Annual Survey of Labor Law, 33 B.C.L.
REv. 468, 478 (1992) (drawing a similar conclusion from English v. General E1ee. Co.,
110 S.Ct. 2270 (1990)).
295) See Kohn & Kohn, supra note 44, at 106.
296) See supra note 56 and accompanying text
297) See Kohn & Kohn, supra note 44, at 167.
298) See supra note 84-91 and accompanying text.
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Regarding a tort action for defamation, the privilege includes behavior which is not
protected under the federal statutes.299 Therefore, the two laws do not conflict directly,
and liability for defamation does not stand as an obstacle to the purpose of enabling an
employee to voice his environmental concerns in good faith, as the "actual malice"
standard for defamation is stricter than the good faith standard for protection under the
300

statutes.

However, although false allegations made in good faith are protected under the federal
scheme, contract law imposes liability in this case. It could be argued that this liability
stands as an obstacle to the purpose offederal environmental whistleblower law.
However, courts have not decided that question yet.

B. INTERRELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN STATE STATOTES AND OTHER ST ATE

LAW

1. Preclusion Of Common Law Whistleblower Claims By State Statutes?
As some jurisdictions acknowledged a tort action for whistleblowing prior to enacting
a whistleblower statute, the question whether the statute precludes tort claims arises.
Some statutes adress that problem by stating explicitly that they are non-exclusive. 30

1

The Montana statute is explicitly exclusive.302 Others give the employee in effect the
choice by ordering that an action under the statutes constitutes a waiver of any other
possible remedy.303 However, many others do not adress the problem.
299) See supra note 80-83, 272-286 and accompanying text.
300) Although Title vn is designed by Congress to apply as broadly as possible, see
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 13 L.Ed.2d 258, 85 S.Ct. 348
(1964), courts allow tort actions in response to a complaint, see Kolosky v. Ancho
Hocking Corp., 35 FEP Cases 1830 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
301) See HAW. REV. STAT. Sec. 378-69; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 30:2027 B. (1); OR.
REv. STAT. Sec. 659.550 (4); N.H. REv. STAT. Sec. 275-E:5.
302) MONT. CODE Sec. 39-2-913.
303) N.J. STAT. ANN. Sec. 34:19-8; N.Y. LAB. LAW Sec. 740 (7); compare Gonzalez
v. John T. Mather Memorial Hosp., 147 Misc.2d 1082,559 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1990)
(preclusion of any other action under any theory of liability) with Flaherty v. The
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Generally, under the "negative implication" rule of statutory interpretation, there is a
preswnption that the legislature impliedly intended a statutory remedy to be exclusive
when enacting a statute creating a comprehensive remedial scheme containing both a
liability and a remedy to enforce the liability.304 Many of the existing statutes contain
such a comprehensive scheme, and with regard to the ones ordering prior internal
procedures, it is not likely that the respective legislature wanted them to be bypassed
eas ilball
y y'

. 305Fll0· owmg th"e negauve
.. unp 1""
owmg a tort actlon.
lcauon argwnent, th e

Michigan306 and Maine307 courts have held their respective statutes exclusive.
However, the acknowledgement and scope of a public policy tort for whistleblowing
.
In

many

0 fth

. at th'e tune t h"err respecuve statutes were enacte d ,308
e states was not certaIn

and it can be argued that the statutes were intended to provide a minimum slandard only.
As no general trend appears,309 one has to look closely at the legislative history,310 the
extent of protection and the state of the acknowledgement of the public policy tort in the
respective jurisdiction at the time of the enactment of the statute to determine the
likelihood of preemption.

Enclave, 255 N.J. Super. 407, 605 A.2d 301 (1992) and Casper v. Paine Webber
Group, Inc., 787 F.Supp. 1480 (D.N.J. 1992) (waiver only of rights and remedies
available for wrongful discharge as a result of disclosure activities).
304) See Note (M.E. Knack), Do State Fair Employment Statutes by "Negative
Implication" Preclude Common-Law Wrongful Discharge Claims Based on the Public
Policy Exception?, 21 MEM.ST.U.L.REv. 527, 530, 538-548 (1991); Pollard v. Bailey,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 520 (1874); Mahoney v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 571 F.Supp. 287, 293
(N.D.Cai. 1983).
305) Compare Dworkin & Near, supra note 8, at 251-52.
306) See Covell v. Spengler, 141 Mich.App. 76, 366 N.W.2d 76 (1985); Shuttleworth
v. Riverside Osteophatic Hosp., 191 Mich.App. 25, 477 N.W.2d 453, app. denied, 487
N.w.2d 468 (1991).
307) See Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 590 A.2d 152 (Me. 1991); but see Larrabee v.
Penobscot Frozen Foods, 486 A.2d 97,100 (Me. 1984); Wyman v. Osteophatic Hosp.,
493 A.2d 330 (Me. 1985); Lofgren, supra note 21, at 332.
308) See compilation at Westman, supra note 5, Appendix D.
309) Compare Westman, supra note 5, at 148 ("the majority approach appears to avoid
creating ...common-law remedies if a pre-existing statutory remedy is already in place")
with Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 246 ("seems to be a trend not to deny ...the full
range of remedies by allowing them to sue for wrongful frring, especially if their only
remedy is reinstatement and lost wages and benefits").
310) Note (M.E.Knack), supra note 304, at 543.
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2. State Statutes And Employer Qaims
State whistleblower protection statutes do not preclude employer or co-employee
contract or tort claims against the whistleblower. As most whistleblower statutes protect
only against discriminatory conduct by the employer with regard to the employment, such
claims are not covered. Pursuant to that, the Michigan, Minnesota and Hawai statutes
assert that the statutory whistleblower protection shall not impair the right of
311

confidentiality of communications protected by other statutes or common law.

As

false allegations ,may violate an employee's duty of confidentiality,312 these statutes seem
313

not only to deny'protection against retaliatory discharge or harassment

but also to

allow for employer contract claims for breach of confidentiality.

IV. SUMMARY: TIIE EXISTING ENVIRONMENTAL WHISTLEBLOWER

LAW

Whistleblowing is, for all practical purposes, not mandated by law, but protected. As
criminal law plays no practical role in protecting whistleblowers, administrative or civil
proceedings are available. Despite some similarities, the content of the existing
whistleblower protection law varies widely. Substantive protection is generally granted
for internal as well as external reporting of violations of environmental law. However,
only violations of the respective statute are covered on the federal level, whereas the
common law tort encompasses clear public policies based on any statute, and the state
statutes mostly limit protection to certain violations of law. As all sources require good
faith reporting, some state statutes demand in addition a reasonable belief that a violation
occured. Only discriminatory conduct affecting the employment relationship is covered,
and state law common protection is furthermore restricted to dismissals. Punitive
damages are in general only available under common law. Finally, the civil actions under
311) HAW. REV. STAT. Sec. 378-66 (1); MICH. COMPo LAWS Sec. 15.366; MINN.
STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.932 Subd. 5.
312) See supra note 240-55 and accompanying text.
313) Compare HAW. REV. STAT. Sec. 378-62 (1); MICH. COMPo LAWS Sec. 15.362;
MINN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 181.932 Subd. 1.
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state law are subject to a statute of limitations between 1 and 4 years, whereas the federal
protection through administrative proceedings is barred after 30 days.
In case his allegations are false, the whistleblower is subject to contract actions for
breach of the implied duties of obedience, loyalty and confidentiality, or of an explicit
confidentiality agreement Employers and co-employees may also bring a defamation
action when the whistleblower acted with actual malice.
Although federal law does not preempt actions under state whistleblower protection
law, it is unclear, whether employer tort or contract claims for damages are possible when
the whistleblowing is covered by federal protection law. Although state whistleblower
statutes in general preclude common law protection actions, they do not preclude
employer claims for damages.
Although the number of whistleblower cases has increased dramatically within the last
10 years, the existing whistleblower law is far from optimal. Despite contrary
expectations by the legislators, the statutes have not substantially encouraged employees
to seek protection under them.314 The main reason why employees prefer common law
..
actrons

IS

th e av ail a b'li
..
d amages. 315 Th e scope 0 f wrong d'omg w h"ICh may
I ty 0 f pumtrve

be reported is rather restricted under most state statutes,316 and most statutes with a
317

broader scope are restricted to equitable remedies.

Furthermore, the extremely short

statute of limitations bars many actions under the federal statutes. However, common law
protection is only acknowledged in about half of the jurisdicitons, is limited to dismissals
only, and carries a certain amount of uncertainty whether the court in the concrete case
will assume a violation of public policy or will hold the common law action precluded.

314) see Dworkin & Near, supra note 8, at 253-260; Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 24344.
315) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 243-44; Barnett, supra note 41, at 446.
316) In general, moreover, it is narrowly interpreted by the courts, compare Dworkin &
Near, supra note 8, at 263 ..
317) See Westman, supra note 5, at 65-66.

CHAPTER 4. IN SEARCH OF AN OPTIMAL WHISTLEBLOWER

LAW

The shortcomings of the existing whistleblower law lead to the question of what an
optimal response to the problem of reporting environmental violations should look like.
After determining what result is desirable by balancing the interests, the most efficient
way to impleme~t this fmding has to be explored.

1. BALANCING THE INTERESTS: IS ENVIRONMENTAL

WHISTLEBLOWING

DESIRABLE?
The underlying assumption for the existing whistleblower law is the general
desirability of having employees reporting on perceived wrongdoing of their
employers.318 However, the question when and what kind of whistleblowing is
desirable in a given situation must balance the legitimate interests of at least the
organization (employer), the whistleblower, and of society at large. The outcome of
balancing the interests is substantially influenced by two major distinctions: Between true
and false allegations and external and internal whistleblowing.

A. TRUE ALLEGATIONS

1. The Interests Of The Organization: Internal Whistleblowing
The legitimate interests of the organization support internal whistle blowing as the most
desirable employee response to violations of environmental law.

318) See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good And Get Rich:
Financial Incentivesfor Whistleblowing And The False Claims Act, 37 Vn..L. L.REv.

273, 276 (1992).
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From the viewpoint of the firm, moreover, there are several arguments against
environmental whistleblowing at all, even when the allegations are true. However, some
of these interests are not legitimate in the sense that the legal system should take them into
account These include the interest in externalizing costs by disregarding environmental
law,319 of saving the costs of correction, including the expenses for an internal
investigation, of preserving management's "peace of mind" by not informing it about
wrongdoing and thus keeping the possible defenses of lack of knowledge and no fault
against liability, or of keeping the image and goodwill of an "environmentally correct"
enterprise.
But a legitimate interest of the firm is maintaining its effectiveness. The effectiveness
of an organization depends at least in part on a functioning authority structure. At least
when whistleblowing circumvent the existing structure of internal responsibility and
supervision, whistleblowing implicitly criticizes the effectiveness of the existing system
of internal control, weakens the chain of command, 320 and constitutes unpredictable
behavior.321 Moreover, whistleblowing may violate group norms and thereby threaten
..
kin g cI'rmate Wit
. hi n th e orgarnzatlOn.
..
the co h·estveness 322 an d pOSItIvewor
The benefits of internal whistleblowing for the organization clearly offset these
interests. As the system of internal control obviously has failed when illegal behavior
occurs within the firm, internal whistleblowing may provide management with the
information the formal internal control system is supposed to provide, but did not.
Information about wrongdoing through internal whistle blowing may benefit the
..
b y ena blin'g It to tak e ear Iy actIon.
. 323 Whi stle bl owrng
. may prevent
organizatIon
319) This might even be true when caught, e.g. when the penalties are lower than the
profit; see e.g. the example at Atkins, supra note 4, at 551 n.l46-148; Miceli & Near,
supra note 6, at 10.
320) This effect may be avoided when whistleblowing is specifically encouraged by the
organization and channels are designated, see Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 9-10.
321)Id. at 10-11.
322) Id. at 81-84 (work group); this is equally true for substantiated and unfounded
allegations, id. at 12.
323) See Boyle, supra note 127, at 828-830; Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 242.
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continued wrongdoing or escalation, and the possibly higher costs resulting from it.324
325

Internal whistleblowing (and correction) may reduce mismanagement

and may avoid

lawsuits and legal regulation.326 It may save costs in addition to the costs of correcting
the wrongdoing, such as fmes or counselling costs arising from government intervention.
327
Internal whistleblowing may help to maintain goodwill and reputation.
At least, it
enables management to steer the information to the outside, thus possibly avoiding
(personal) liability or negative publicity.328 Finally, although internal whistleblowing
may disturb the working climate, it may also benefit it by having a pacifying effect on the
workforce, may increase a feeling of security and that the employer cares,329 and by
330

encouraging ethical behavior.

From the point of view of the firm, internal whistleblowing is not only preferable to no
whistleblowing at all, but also to external whistleblowing. Compared to internal
whistleblowing, external reporting has major disadvantages for the firm. External
whistleblowing may lead to additional costs besides the ones arising for investigating and
correcting the wrongdoing internally. Government may impose costly measures to
prevent further hazards, may revoke or limit licenses, fine the organization, and hold it
liable for damages. The organization may lose efficient managers, either through
imprisonment or through loss of legal prerequisites necessary to remain in their
function,331 or as a result of public or shareholder pressure to discharge managers
perceived responsible for the wrongdoing. Violations of environmental law may lead to a
severe loss of goodwill and reputation. 332 When violations are only corrected after

324) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 6; Atkins, supra note 4, at 544.
325) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 12.
326) [d. at 13.
327) [d.
328) See Atkins, supra note 6, at 544; see the examples at Westman, supra note 5, at 30.
329) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 11.
330) [d. at 11-12.
331) E.g. disbarment of an in-house counsel.
332) see Dworkin & Near, supra note 8, at 251.
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government intervention, the responsible agency may lose its trust in the finn. Straining
existing good working relationships with regulatory agencies is generally not desirable
due to the great amount of agency discretion. Moreover, agency involvement bears an
increased risk that the public willieam of the violations. Due to widespread awareness
concerning environmental issues, market shares and the availability of supplies or bank
credit may be affected, and difficulties in hiring or holding much-needed employees may
arise.

2. The Interests Of Society: External Whistleblowing
Society as a whole has a clear interest in environmental whistleblowing. Compliance
with environmental law helps to preserve or improve existing living conditions, and
protects the public health and safety.333 Whistleblowing leads to increased compliance,
either voluntary or enforced, without demanding additional public funds for
.,
334 d etectIon
. an d'deVI ence gat h'enng. 335
supervision,
From the viewpoint of society at large, basically four arguments make external
whistleblowing preferable to internal reporting.
Firstly, society has a strong interest in controlling and monitoring cleanup efforts by
the organization. Although wrongdoing may be corrected faster and more cost-efficiently
by a receptive management, the response to internal whistleblowing is entirely at the
discretion of the employer.
Considering the immense costs of environmental clean-ups, the danger exists that
without government supervision, not all necessary steps will be taken. A private sector
firm has to act economically in minimizing costs. Generally, the ideal way of compliance
from its point of view is the least expensive one. Therefore, an organization will tend to
333) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 8,14; Atkins, supra note 4, at 537-538.
334) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 14.
335) Atkins, supra note 6, at 537, 544; contra James W. Hubbell, Retaliatory Discharge
and the Economics of Deterrence, 60 U.Colo.L.Rev. 91,105 (1989) (false claims
penalize innocent corporate behavior and thus reduce statutory enforcement).
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correct wrongdoing with minimum efforts and generally will be reluctant to investigate
other damages to the environment or third parties possibly caused by its conduct.
Furthermore, internal whistleblowing gives the employer the chance to silence
legitimate environmental concerns.336 An employee-whistleblower

often will not be able

to verify whether the employer really took all necessary steps to correct the wrongdoing.
In case the employer only pretends to do s0337 or just covers up the misconduct,338
objectively inadequate employer action may appease the employee's concerns and prevent
further complain,ts.339 Moreover, the organization may also threaten the employee into or
buy h·IS silence. 340
Secondly, internal whistleblowing exempts the fIrm from large parts of its
responsibility and allows it to keep parts of the profIts of its wrongdoing. Even when the
organization complies in the future and cleans up existing environmental damages, nOI all
violations of environmental law lead to damages which can be measured and
corrected.341 Society as a whole or third persons eventually bear the costs of such past
violations in the form of living in a more polluted environment. Civil fInes and penalties
have at least partially the function to provide government with the fInancial means to
respond to future damages resulting from such conduct and to take away fInancial
advantages resulting from it.342 In a case of internal whistleblowing, the fIrm is not
subjected to such fInes. It may not only keep the costs saved by externalizing the disposal

336) Contra Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 242 (possibility of EXTERNAL
whistleblowing sufficient).
337) See Barnett, supra note 41, at 443.
338) See Boyle, supra note 127, at 828.
339) In many reported whistleblower cases, the employee complained externally after
internal reports did not have a satisfying outcome.
340) Compare John D. Feerick, Toward a Model Whistleblower Law, 19 Fordham Urb.
LJ. 585, 592-93 (1992); see to the danger of cover-ups Terry Morehead Dworkin &
Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting The Interests Of The
Employee, The Organization, and Society, 29 Am.Bus.L.J. 265,284 (1991); Fidell,
supra note 52, at 22.
341) E.g. air pollution.
342) See, e.g .• Sec. 120 CAA (noncompliance penalties).
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of sewage or gases, but also the potentially higher profits made due to the competitive
advantage resulting from non-compliance.
Thirdly, government involvement shows the citizen that it takes its protective role
seriously, and that environrnentallaws

have to be obeyed. Penalties and criminal

prosecution of wrongdoers serve not only material justice and equality before the law, but
deter the wrongdoer and others with similar propensities from future violations. Thus,
punishment secures and fosters overall compliance through individual and general
343

deterrence.

Finally, external whistleblowing helps to update environmental data and to make
government aware about problems in compliance, thus leading to more efficient future
regulation and a better determination of the crucial points control should focus on.

3. Conflicting Interests Of The Whistleblower
An employee has conflicting interests with regard to environmental whistleblowing. In
his role as a member of society, which interests are his as well, external whistleblowing
is the action to take. However, in his role as a member of the firm, the viability of the
firm constitutes a legitimate interest of the employee as a prerequisite for the future
existence of the workplace, and acting in the best interest of the firm generally will lead
him to internal reporting. Finally, the employee has a personal interest apart from the ones
his different roles prescribe. His personal interests in maintaining his job and a friendly
work environment in which he is not being harassed, socially rejected or sued for
damages asks for either refraining from whistleblowing at all, or for internal
whistleblowing as the way most likely not to evoke such reactions. As his personal
interests are presumably then best served, employees will generally tend to internal
whistleblowing.
343) Compare Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 14; Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 318,
at 285; Fidell, supra note 52, at 29 n.164 ("belief that - despite whistleblowing - no action
is taken discourages whistleblowing").
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B. FALSE ALLEGATIONS
In general, false allegations are neither in the interest of the organization nor of society.
344

False allegations incur investigation costs for both the employer

and the government,

and public resources are wasted by binding funds and manpower in unnecessary
investigations or court proceedings.345 Authority structure and working climate within
the organization are unnecessarily disturbed, and despite the fact that the allegations are
false, the danger of loss of goodwill exists when the public learns of them. Information
about allegations of wrongdoing or ongoing government investigations leaking out to the
public may result in irreparable damages to the fIrm. Especially when potentially high
liability is involved, stock may plunge, and creditors and business partners may
withdraw. Reputation and image are fragile commodities, and the public not always acts
rationally in condemning activities. Although administrative procedures are designed to
protect the rights of a wrongfully accused and to keep information confIdential,346 these
safeguards do not always work.
However, the negative effects of false allegations in general are partly offset by the
potential benefIts for both the organization and society of reporting suspicions, even
when they turn out to be false. Given the complexity of environmental regulation and the
underlying technical processes, an employee often can only suspect that a specifIc
conduct violates environmental law. However, actual violations are often detected when
reporting a suspicion triggered an investigation. Therefore, the risk of a claim turning out
to be false is inherent in many of the whistleblowing acts. Considering the strong
interests of the organization and society in learning of violations, investigation costs,
disruption of working climate and threats to an organization's goodwill may be offset by
the potential benefIts of reporting suspicions.

344) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 7.
345) [d. at 8, 13; see Atkins, supra note 4, at 541; Westman, supra note 5, at 29.
346) Compare Martin H. Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower From Retaliatory
Discharge, 16 MICH.J.L.REF. 277, 306 (1983).
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Moreover, investigations proving that no violations occured provide this infonnation
to the employer and government Government investigations of suspicions show the
public and industry its willingness to enforce environmental law , thus serving the
purposes of general deterrence and protecting the public safety and health. An employer
learning of suspicions may clarify the legality of his conduct to his employees to pacify
concerns within the fInn347 and thus to prevent outside reporting with its potentially
negative effect on the goodwill. Finally, internal reporting of suspicions enables the
employer to react adequately when government or the public learns of it and raises the
issue.

C. BALANCING THE INTERESTS: IN FAVOR OF EXTERNAL
WHISTLEBLOWING
In order to reach a fair result, whistleblower regulation has to evaluate and balance the
interests involved, both with regard to true and to false allegations. By balancing the
conflicting interests, external whistleblowing seems to be the desirable goal of
whistleblower legislation.

I. Balancing The Interests Of The Organization And Of Society
By weighing the burdens of government involvement for the fIrm with the strong
societal interests in controlled investigation and clean-ups, in holding the wrongdoer
responsible for past misconduct, and the individual and general deterrence effect of
government involvement, these burdens seem bearable.
Both forms of reporting have the potential to correct mismanagement

Although

external whistleblowing may challenge the authority structure and may disturb the
working climate more intensely, these effects only gradually differ from internal
reporting.
347) See Dworkin & Near, supra note 6, at 263-64.
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Costs in addition to its own investigation and correction expenses arise for the fInn
from governemnt involvment only when the allegations are true, as the fInn only has to
carry the costs of government involvement, fInes and liability when it is responsible for
wrongdoing. From the viewpoint of government, the lost expenses for its investigations
in cases of false allegations are outweighed by far by the potential fInancial gains for the
public from civil fInes and liability in case of increased true external whistleblowing.
Besides these additional costs and the costs for supervision, government involvement
does not necessarily incur higher costs for the clean-up itself. As management usually
knows the situation best, government may let the company propose a clean-up plan and
may approve it when reasonable. Thus, interference with management's discretion can be
minimized, and the reaction to the wrongdoing may be as cost-effective and effIcient as in
cases of internal whistleblowing.
Finally, the employer's interest in preserving his goodwill is only legitimate when the
alleged violations did not occur. To mitigate the severe effects on the reputation and
goodwill of the fIrm even false allegations may have, full and fast cooperation with
government provides opportunity for the employer to show that the allegations are
348

unfounded and thus to reduce the reputational damage.

The negative outcome of a

government investigation affirms the correctness of the fIrm's conduct toward the
environment and may be even used to build up goodwill. As the safeguards of
administrative procedure prevent at least in part that information leaks out, however, the
number of false complaints has to be kept as low as possible.

2. Protecting The Interests Of The Whistleblower
As balancing of the respective interests of the organization and society points in favor
of external whistleblowing, the interests of the whistleblower, leading him to prefer
internal reporting, can be mitigated by whistleblower regulation. As fInes, liability and
348) See Malin, supra note 346, at 306.
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other effects of whistleblowing on the viability of the firm depend on the nature of the
violations, whistleblower law cannot influence this factor. However, regulation can raise
public consciousness regarding the desirability of environmental whistleblowing and thus
help to prevent social rejection. More important, it can take away the major reason for an
employee not to report at all or only internally by protecting him effectively against
dismissal and harassment

II. THE DESIRABLE WAY: ENCOURAGING EXTERNAL WHIS1LEBLOWING
THROUGH REGULATION

A. THEORETICAL WAYS TO ENCOURAGE WHIS1LEBLOWING
Environmental whistleblowing may be furthered in two ways. Firstly, the law can set
incentives for blowing the whistle, either by mandating reports and imposing criminal
349

sanctions for not reporting, or by giving a positive incentive in rewarding reports.

With regard to environmental whistleblowing, neither of these has been utilized yet.
Secondly, the law can impose direct disincentives, such as fines, imprisonment or
forfeitures, to prevent employer conduct discouraging reporting. It can also try to remove
disincentives for the employee, such as the fear of retaliation, by protecting him against
such adverse behavior.350 As shown supra, the existing whistleblower law nearly
exclusively focuses on protection against retaliation.

B. RECEPTIVENESS

OF WmS1LEBLOWING

TO LEGAL REGULATION

To be efficient, environmental whistleblower law has to take into account the
sociological factors influencing whistleblowing. In a recent study based on a
comprehensive evaluation of the existing sociological literature, Miceli and Near35 I have
349) Fidell, supra note 52, at 5.

350) Id.
351) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 49-92.
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developed a model of whistleblowing. This model will be used to show which factors
shape the whistleblowing process and how employment regulation can influence external
whistleblowing.
Miceli and Near's model divides the whistleblowing process into 5 steps: (1) The
(perceived) wrongdoing, (2) the decision making process whether to blow the whistle or
not, (3) the actual act of whistleblowing, (4) the reactions of others to it, and finally (5)
352

the assessment of these reactions by the whistleblower.

Steps (2),(4) and (5) are the

ones most likely, to be influenced by legal regulation.

1. The Decision-Making Process
The decision making process can be divided into at least 4 sub-steps.353 All steps are
strongly shaped by personal features of the potential whistleblower, such as his
intellectual ability to detect wrongdoing,354 his self-esteem and self-confidence,355 his
educationallevel,356

and the development of a general sense ofresponsibility357

for

.
th e organIzatIon,
..
358 0 f mo ral' JUd gement 359 an d 0 f an ill
. di VI'd Ual
SOCIetyor

.

conSCIence.

360

The recognition phase, in which the potential whistleblower applies his personal
standard of what constitutes wrongdoing to his perception of what has actually taken
place, is not responsive to whistleblower law.

352) Id. at 48-92.
353) Id. at 58-72.
354) Id. at 103-105.
355) Id. at 109-110.
356) Id. at 119-120 (only slightly); 127-128 (knowledge oflegal standards).
357) Id. at 112-114.
358) Id. at 124-127 (as reflected by higher status, such as supervisor).
359) Id. at 105-109.
360) Formed e.g. by religious and quasi-religious beliefs (environment) or by peer
pressure (membership in environmental organizations); see WestIllan, supra note 6, at 28;
Myron Peretz Glazer & Penina Migdal Glazer, The Whistleblowers. Exposing Corruption
in Government & Industry 97-132 (1989) (exploring the power of belief systems); see
the accounts of whistleblowers in Westin, supra note 6, at 17-130 and in Peretz & Peretz,

Id.
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However, the assessment phase, in which the whistleblower decides if the triggering
event deserves action, as well as the two subsequent decision phases are. The outcome of
the decisions of whether it is his responsibility to take action at all, and if yes, whether
whistleblowing is the choice, may be shaped by law. All of these three phases are
'nfl uence
1

db y th e nom be r 0f' mC!'d ents perceIv
. edl y constItumg
..
.
wrong d'omg, 361 th err
363

perceived seriousness,362 and whether clear and direct evidence exists.

The crucial decision whether to choose whistleblowing may be divided into three,
.
'bl' y mtertwm'ed , steps. 364
mextnca
Firstly, perceiving whistleblowing per se as an appropriate alternative to other choices
of action is more likely when support from friends and family is expected, 365 when the
individual perceives whistleblowing per se as desirable,366 or when the societal
culture367 generally is supportive to whistleblowing.
Secondly, empirical research suggests that the evaluation of the costs and benefits of
whistleblowing for the individual employee, although largely subjective and depending
on the personality of the whistleblower, is heavily influenced by concerns about personal
disadvantages. Empirically, whistleblowing is less likely when the individual believes
that continuing the wrongdoing is critical for the survival of the organization,368 or if the
wrongdoer has a high status in it.369 Internal whistleblowing occurs more often when
.,.
...
371 an d' IS percelv. ed as
the organIzatIon
IS lb'
ess ureaucratIc, 370 stresses partICIpatIOn
responsive to whistleblowing.372 This data seems to suggest that the personal interest in

361) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 141-142.
362) [d. at 138-142.
363) [d. at 137-138.
364 ) [d. at 59-72.
365) [d. at 148.
366) [d. at 114.
367) [d. at 164.
368) [d. at 162-163.
369) [d. at 147-148.
370) [d. at 156-158.
371) [d. at 157,158-160.
372) [d. at 148-150.
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survival of the workplace, the wrongdoer's ability to retaliate as well as the general
likelihood of adverse employer reactions plays an important role. However, empirical
research is not entirely clear how the threat of retaliation influences the decison to blow
the whistle.373 Probably, the perceived threat of retaliation, the individual
whistleblower's personality and the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing as well as
existing alternatives to whistleblowing all influence the decision.
Finally, an employee who has decided to blow the whistle faces at least three questions
on how to do it: Alone or together with others, internally or externally, and openly or
anonymously.

374

In practice, the percentage of whistleblowers reporting alone or going with others is
roughly equal, and empirical data show no convincing influence for either one of the
.
375
al ternanves.
Empirically, nearly all whistleblowers who used external channels also reported
internally.376 Internal as opposed to external whistleblowing is more likely when the
organization is perceived to be responsive to whistleblowing,377 when the whistleblower
..
378 or IS
.. a supervIsor. 379 p ercelve
. d
h as a h·Ig h status WI·th·In th e organIzanon,
380

responsiveness reduces the confrontational effect of allegations of wrongdoing

and

the likeliness of extreme adverse reactions of the employer or fellow employees to the
allegations. On the contrary, internal reporting may even lead the employer to regard the
whistleblower as a responsible and caring member of the organization. However. harsh
reactions are possible as well, and it may be sometimes more difficult for the employee to

373) Id. at 153-156; this finding is consistent with the (self-) description of
whistleblowers in Westin, supra note 6, at 17-130 and Glazer & Glazer, supra note 360
374) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 61.
375) Id. at 61.
376) Id. at 26-27.
377) Id. at 148-150.
378) Id. at 123-127.
379) Id. at 125.
380) See Malin, supra note 346, at 313; compare Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 242.
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381

face the wrongdoer directly than to report to outside recipients.

Status as a supervisor

or a generally high status within the fIrm reflect a special responsibility for the fInn and in
the latter case presumably diminishes the vulnerability for retaliation.
Finally, most whistleblowers do not choose to report anonymously but identify
themselves.382 This might be explained by the fact that remaining anonymous leads to a
loss of effectiveness of the complaint. 383 Lodging it anonymously may be perceived by
the recipient as unwillingness to face the target of the accusation. This and the inability to
assess the report,diminishes the credibility of the complaint. Furthermore, there is no
chance to contact the whistleblower when the amount of information and evidence given
is not sufficient. Although the latter consequence can be circumvened by disclosing the
whistleblower's identity only to the recipient, the whistleblower makes then himself
..
384
d epen d ent on th e recIpient.

2. Reactions To Whistleblowing
Environmental whistleblowing may induce the reactions at least of the complaint
recipients (government agency or management), of other members of the organization,
and of outsiders such as family, friends, trade unions and the media. However,
government reaction is largely compelled by environmental and administrative law, and
the influence of outsiders in the whistleblowing process depends on the facts of the case
and is outside the scope of this article.
With regard to the reaction of the organization and its members, empirical research
suggests a tendency of the organization to resist the change sought by the whistleblower
rather than to correct its behavior.385 The reactions of management and other

381) See Barnett, supra note 41, at 444; Westman, supra note 5, at 69.
382) Westman, supra note 5, at 61.
383) [d. at 76-77.
384) [d. at 76-77.
385) [d. at 85; for public relations strategies compare id. at 87.
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organization members regarding the act of whistleblowing itself may cover the whole
range from support and encouragement to hostility and retaliation. However, with the
.
excepuon

0fth

.. al
e wrong d oer w h'0 IS lik e 1y to thre aten or carry out ret al"muon, 386 empmc
387

research suggests that usually neither of these extremes occurs.

Whether supportive or hostile reactions of management occur may depend on the
power relationships between whistleblower and management. The power of the
whistleblower within the organization, the need for his fUUlreservices, and the nature of
amt Its,e are Important f·actors. 388
th e comp l"lf'
The reaction of co-workers depends on whether they perceive whistleblowing as a
violation of group norms. When it violates such norms they perceive as right even after
the whistleblowing occured, they will encourage the withdrawal of the complaint and will
finally socially reject the whistleblower if he does not comply.389 Especially when the
whistleblower "presents a good case:.390 the group may on the other hand alter its
391

standard to the standard the whistleblower has set.

3. Assessment Of The Reactions And Decison How To Respond
The final stage in the whistleblowing process is the assessment of these reactions and
the decision of how to respond to it. The main influencing factor in this stage is whether
the whistleblower is satisfied with the outcome of the whistleblowing, that is if he
believes that a change in organizational behavior correcting the wrongdoing has
occurred.392 If yes, the whistleblowing process usually ends. Otherwise, several options
of future behavior exist. The whistleblower can repeat his report or take other courses of
actions, such as complaining to external recipients after an internal report did not lead to a
Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 79.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 84-85.
Resistance strategy; see id. at 81-84.
390) Id. at 83.
391) Accomodation strategy, see id. at 83.
392) Id. at 88.

386)
387)
388)
389)
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change. If he perceives further action as generally desirable, but not feasible, he may end
the whistleblowing process as well. Influential factors in this decision are the
whistleblower's perception of the likely success of further action and the perceived risk
involved.393 The threat or experience of retaliation may serve as a deterrent to further
action or may influence the whistleblower to leave the organization voluntarily without
further complaint. However, it also may lead him to complain not only about the
.. agamst th ere tali atory beh'aVlOf.394
wrong d·omg b ut to see k protectIon

4. Shaping Whistleblower Behavior Through Employment Law
Reviewing the main sociological factors shaping a whistleblower's decision to act
reveals that some of them are not responsive to employment regulation. Personal features
and the perception of how serious the wrongdoing and how clear the evidence is cannot
be altered by legal regulation.
However, the power relationship between employer and employee, resulting in the
fear of personal disadvantages, the societal climate towards whistleblowing, the
prevailing group norms among employees within the fIrm, and the responsiveness of the
organization can be influenced.
In general, any legal regulation encouraging whistleblowing shows that it is a desirable
goal. Such a demonstration, possibly increased by notifIcation requirements, may change
the attitude of society, employers and employees toward whistleblowing, and thus may
lead to more widespread acceptance of and therefore increased reporting.
Incentives, such as criminal sanctions for not reporting or rewards for doing so, may
outweigh the fear of retaliation and of social rejection. Likewise, imposing direct
disincentives in the form of criminal or civil sanctions for hindering whistleblowing on
the employer alters the power relationship between employer and whistleblower

393) Id. at 89.
394) Id. at 88-89.
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dramatically and would force the fInn to be responsive. Effective protection against
adverse employer behavior would lead to the same result All of these ways can be
structured to encourage external whist1eblowing.

C. INCENTIVES FOR BLOWING THE WHISTI..E?

1. Mandating Whistleb10wing?
The most forceful way to encourage whistleblowing would be to mandate it by threat
of criminal or civil fInes. However, the First Amendment right of free expression and to
••
..
'
.
pennon
government &.or redre ss 0f' gnevances 395 protects a clnzen
agarnst
state acuon

compe lli ng h·lffi to proVI'd'nf'
e I orman on. 396 Th e S upreme C ourt app 1"les In cases 0f
compelled speech a balancing test, weighing the competing government interest in
397

gathering infonnation against the individual's right not to speak.

As there may be

perfectly legitimate reasons to maintain silence about illegal acts of somebody else, and
considering the importance of free speech in our society, it has been suggested that "the
mere fact that a person whishes not to speak about a matter should create an initial
presumption against compelled utterances on that subject. ,,398 At least, a general duty to
inform government about any, even minor, violation oflaw seems constitutionally
problematic.
Against this background, there is no environmental or criminal law compelling an
employee to report violations oflaw. Misprision offelony, the crime closest to instituting
a general duty to report, requires in addition to the failure to report a criminal offense

395) U.S. CaNST. amend. I.
396) See FRANKLYNS. HAIMAN, SPEECHAND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY348-367
(1981).
397) See, e.g., Barenblatt v. U.S.; Uphaus v. Wyman, 369 U.S. 72,126-134 (1959);
Haiman, supra note 396, at 349-351.
398) Haiman, supra note 396, at 351.
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,,400
elt er an active act 0 conce
ent,
an ev motive to prevent or e ay Justice,
or
covers only felohies involving violence.4O 1 Even with this restriction, courts look
disfavorab1y not only on misprision,402 but on the idea of criminally enforcab1e duties to
. gene.ral403Thi s re 1uctance may h'ave Its roots p art!y m
. th e negative
.. expenences
report m
with mandatory or encouraged informing of government in totalitarian countries or the
United States during the McCarthy area.404
Furthermore, although a citizen should be encouraged to support clear and vital public
interests embodipd in legislative acts, such as environmental protection law, generating a
general "informant mentality" is not a preferable goal for a society. Therefore, and as the
individual has to bear the potentially severe personal and social consequences of an act of
whistleb1owing, the law should leave the individual the choice of whether he wants to
report or not Leaving him the choice respects his individual conscience and his
evaluation of the concrete situation. Therefore, encouraging a citizen to voluntarily inform
law enforcement authorities, but not mandating it, seems the most desirable way to
proceed.

405

399) See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4 (1970); N.J. REv. STAT. Sec. 2A:97-2.
400) Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 459, 61 N.E.2d 849, 852 (1945); see
Wesnnan, supra note 5, at 26.
401) WASH. REv. CODE ANN. Sec. 9.69.100; see Note (Merek Lipson), supra note 236,
at 183.
402) See Note (Merek Lipson), supra note 236, at 175; Callahan & Dworkin, supra note
341, at 331.
403) Compare the famous quotation in Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. 556, 5 L.Ed. 522
(1822) ("it may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to proclaim every
offense which comes to his knowledge; ...the law which would punish him in every case
for not performing this duty is too harsh for man ").
404) See Malin, supra note 346, at 303.
405) See Wesnnan, supra note 5, at 105 (pointing to statutes rewarding whistleblowing);
Fidell, supra note 52, at 5.
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2. Rewarding Whistleblowing?
Sociological-psychological

research strongly supports that a properly administered
406

system of fmancial rewards can effectively encourage whistleblowing.

Although there

is no law granting any "extrinsic,,407 rewards for environmental whistleblowing, positive
408

incentives in the form of financial rewards exist in other areas.

On the state level, only
409

a few statutes provide for very modest rewards for blowing the whistle.

In general,

the states seem to dislike the idea, 410 and some even deny protection from retaliation
41

when the employee personally gains from his reporting.

I However, Congress has

enacted several statutes which provide for the possibility of monetary rewards for
whistleblowing.412 Generally, granting an award and its amount is at the discretion of
the administering federal agency,413 and most of these statutes have not had much impact
415

on encouraging whistleblowing.414 However, the False Claims Act

guarantees a

minimum recovery to the informant. After establishing the mandatory minimum recovery,

406) See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 340, at 283-302.
407) Extrinsic rewards, i.e. money or promotions, are benefits depending upon external
factors, see id. at 285.
408) Recently, private rewards for whistleblowers have been created, see Jeff Goldberg,
Truth & Consequences, OMNI, Nov. 1990, at 73, 113; James Strodes, Corporations
Discover That It's Good To Be Good, Bus. & SOC'Y REv., Summer 1990, at 57-58.
409) See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. Sec. 8-27-20 (25 % of public savings resulting from
the reporting in the first year up to $ 2.000,-); WIse. STAT. ANN. Sec. 230.83 (2)
(rewards possible).
410) See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 340, at 278-79.
411) See, e.g., 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 1422,1423; W.VA. CODE Sec. 6C-l2(d),-1-3; WISe. STAT. ANN. Sec. 230.83 (2).
412) See, e.g., 12 V.S.C. Sec. 1831k (Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989, FIRREA) (maximum reward of $ 100.000,- for information
which leads to recovery of $ 50.000,- or more of GOVERNMENT money spent to "bail
out" banks or savings and loans); 15 V.S.C. Sec. 78u-1 (e) (Insider Trade and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988) (up to 10 % of penalties for information leading to civil
insider-trading penalties); 26 V.S.C. Sec. 7623 (tax informer statute); 19 V.S.C. Sec.
1619 (customs informer statute).
413) See, e.g., 12 V.S.C. Sec. 1831k (a), (d) (FIRREA); 17 C.F.R. Sec. 201.61
(Securities Exchange Act).
414) See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 340, at 306.
415) 31 V.S.C.
3729-3733.
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actions under the Act have skyrocketed from an annual average of 6 to 280 in 1990, with
. ten d en(lY.416
growmg
Despite its suitability for encouraging whistleb10wing, and despite the fact that self..
...
mterest
as a motive f or reporting

IS

not m heren tl y wrong, 417 fin'al
anci

rewar d s for

environmental whistleb10wing seem not to be appropriate.
First of all, whistleblowing driven by greed for possibly large amounts of money
increases the danger of frivolous complaints. The existing whistleblower protection law
lowers the potential cost of reporting for the employee substantially by taking largely
away the fear of succesful employer retaliation. As his only gain is a better environment,
his decision to report is mainly based on the perceived seriousness of the violations and
how clear the evidence is.418 Thus, the employee evaluates the situation and bases his
decision mainly on the perceived need for correction. Introducing financial rewards alters
that decision process substantially. Not the need for correction, but the possible personal
profit may be determinative. Carried into the extreme, the employee will report even the
slightest suspicion in the hope that something may come out of it. Therefore, the danger
that false allegations will be reported increases dramatically.
Secondly, financial rewards for whistleblowers may offset the savings for supervision
419

and regulation increased whistleblowing is supposed to provide.

Violations of

environmental law not always result in civil fmes 420 or in recovery of damages
exceeding the amount necessary for clean_up.421 There may be either no sanction, or
only imprisonment. Environmental law may only provide for actual, not for punitive
damages. Granting awards only when governemnt makes a profit would leave large parts
of environmental law out, reducing the effectiveness of a reward system. As empirical
416) See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 340, at 318.

417) [d. at 319-323.
418) See supra note 362-364 and accompanying text.
419) See supra note 335-36 and accompanying text.
420) See, e.g., 42 D.S.C. Sec. 9609 (a) (1) (CERCLA) (no civil fines for all violations).
421) See, e.g., 42 D.S.C. Sec. 960 (a) (4) (CERCLA) (damages restricted to cost of
clean-up and assessment).
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research shows that rewards have to be substantial to work,422 paying rewards out of
government funds even when no gain is made will possibly burden governemnt with
additional expenses which might, under an overall evalaution, not be offset by the gains
made in other cases in which civil fines and punitive damages are recovered.
TIrirdly, as an employee either may be protected against employer retaliation or such
retalition may not occur, it is not necessary to reward a whistleblower for the risk he takes
.
b YproVl'din g a firnanCl'al rew ard •..
.or reportrng. 423 It seems more appropnate
to protect
him against concrete adverse employer conduct.

D. IMPOSING AND REMOVING DISINCENTIVES TO WHISTLEBLOWING

1. Imposing Direct Disincentives On The Employer
Although no criminal sanctions for intimidating whistleblowers exist, several of the
state whistleblower statutes provide for civil fines when an employer retaliates against a
protected whistleblower.424 However, the fines are in general low and do not pose much
of a threat.425 Despite their potential discouraging effect on employer behavior, direct
disincentives in the form of criminal or civil sanctions seem not to be the most desirable
way to encourage whistleblowing.
Criminal sanctions should be restricted to behavior which is of crucial importance to
the well-being of society. As reflected by the absence of criminal sanctions in the current
whistleblower law, retaliation against environmental whistleblowers, although
undesirable from the viewpoint of society, is below this threshold. The existing criminal
law provides for sanctions for extreme adverse employer actions such as assault or

422) See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 340, at 298,301.
423) But see id. at 330-331.
424) See supra note 229-234 and accompanying text.
425) See Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 243.
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coercion 426. Considering the general trend to decriminalization as promulgated by the
Model Penal Code, criminal sanctions for "ordinary" retaliation such as dischatge or
transfers seem not to be appropriate. When providing the whistleblower with a cause of
action against retaliation, direct government involvement in the employee-employer
relationship by assessing a civil fme seems not to be desirable as well.
Government would have to investigate and prove the reasons for the retaliation. The
effectiveness of the threat of civil fmes would depend latgely on how keen governemnt
prosecutes retalhltory behavior. This would involve considerable expenses and staff.
However, the atnount of a civil fine has to reflect the seriousness of the wrongdoing. The
relatively low maximum in the statutes containing a civil fine provision indicates that
retaliatory behavior in general cannot justify high fines. Therefore, the collected fmes will
possibly be lower than the expenses for the government involvement, thus burdening the
budget Even giving the employee a private cause of action in addition to the possibility of
governemnt imposing a fine does not solve this problem. Although government could use
the evidence provided in this action for assessing a fine and thus lower its costs, there ate
many legitimate reasons why an employee may not want to sue his employer for
retaliation. One of the likely reasons not to sue is when it is difficult to prove retaliatory
motive. However, equality before the law requires government to investigate these cases
as well.
Moreover, government involvement seems not to be necessary. As the civil fines have
to be relatively modest, they do not pose much of a threat. Allowing the employee to
recover for emotional distress and punitive datnages leads potentially to substantial
awatds discouraging employers from retaliation. Furthermore, as the employee and not
government beatS the retaliation, the employee should be able to gain something. And
finally, the employee, as the only victim of retaliation and who has to cope with the

426) See MODEL PENAL CODE Sec. 212.5.
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further situation, should be able to make the choice whether he challenges his employer or
whether he keeps quiet and takes it 427

2. Removing Disincentives: Protecting The Employee Against
Adverse Employer Actions
The existing environmental whistleblower law focuses entirely on removing
disincentives to reporting violations by protecting the employee against retaliatory
discharge and h~assment. Although removing disincentives seems, as shown infra, the
most appropriate way to encourage whistleblowing, the current whistleblower law has
several flaws and shortcomings. In part E., the parameters of an optimal whistleblower
law will be discussed.

E. REMOVING DISINCENTIVES: AN OU1l..INE OF AN OPTIMAL
WHISlLEBLOWER

PROTECTION LAW

1. Statutory Versus Common Law Protection
Whistleblowing should be regulated by state statute, not by common law. As one
author puts it, statutes "can take a bird's eye view on the total problem, instead of that of
an owl on a segment They can encompass wide generalizations from experience that a
judge is precluded from making in his decision on a particular case ...They avoid the
wasteful cost in time and money of piecemeal litigation that all too frequently culminates
. a crazy qu il toes
frul
m

d efy'mg mte
. lli gent restatement or co herent app Ii'canon. ..428 A

carefully drafted statute, taking into account all aspects the public or the experts focus on,

427) One may, especially in smaller comunities, fear being blackballed or being socially
rejected.
428) See ROBERTJ. TAYNOR,COMMENTON COURTSANDLAWMAKING,LEGAL
INSTI11JTIONSTODAYAND TOMORROW,THE CENTENNIALCONFERENCE,Volume 48
(1959).
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429

seems to be the best response to whistleblowing.

Such a statute, especially one

containing the requirement that the employer has to notify his employees of its existence
and content, documents the general viability of environmental whistieblowing.430 As the
federal legislature has only limited powers in the areas of environmental and labor law
and existing federal legislation does not preempt state whistleblower statutes,431 the state
level seems appropriate for such legislation. Given the mobility of the workforce today,
uniformity between the state statutes should be achieved by following a model
whistleblower statute.

2. Parameters Of An Optimal Environmental Whistleblower Statute

a. Substantive Protection

aa. Covered Relationships
The statute should cover broadly all private employment relationships. Restrictions
concerning the number of employees 432 should be abandoned. Although in a smaller
firm the personal relationship between employer and whistleblower is closer and
reporting is more likely to be perceived as "disloyal" by the employer, the underlying
interests do not differ from larger fIrms. Protection should be given also when another
person acts on behalf of the employee,433 as an employee may be too timid to contact a
government agency himself, or may intellectually not be able to communicate his
concerns clearly.
429) See Maurice Rosenberg, Anything Legislatures Can Do, Courts Can Do Better?, 62
A.B.A.I. 587, 589 (1976) (pointing out legislature's superior resources for fact
gathering).
430) ld. at 589 (assurance that a legislative solution does not run counter to the public
will).
431) See supra note 287-301 and accompanying text.
432) See supra note 58-60,163-166 and accompanying text.
433) See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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bb. Protected Activity
For the reasons which favor encouraging external rather than internal
whistleblowing,434 internal reporting should not be protected. True internal reporting
serves environmental protection better than no reporting at all. However, employees tend
in general more to internal reporting,435 especially when the employer shows his
receptiveness for whistleblowing by setting up internal complaint mechanisms. Given a
sufficient degree of protection of external whistleblowing and none to internal, an
employee will more likely opt for reporting externally when he is in doubt about the
receptiveness of his employer. Thus, employers who want to prevent widespread external
...
. 436 hi'ave to set up c ear mtern al
an d to furt her th·err mterest
m mtern al repomng
whistleblower mechanisms and have to demonstrate that they deal effectively with the
complaints and do not retaliate. Therefore, the threat of external whistleblowing drives
employers to make internal whistleblowing attractive, and overall reporting is more likely
to increase. However, despite such possible countermoves of an employer, a
whistleblower statute making external whistleblowing the most secure way for the
employee will encourage its occurrence substantially.
In order to encourage external whistleblowing, the act of communication, the possible
government recipients, and the scope of the wrongdoing which may be reported should
be defmed broadly. Any disclosures to any government authority, regardless of the level
of government and whether charged with environmental protection or not, should be
covered. Given the complicated allocation of jurisdiction between agencies,
whistle blower protection should not depend on whether the employee was able to figure
out what agency has jurisdiction, but should be made as easy as possible. Finally,
wrongdoing should be defined broadly as any conduct which might violate any federal,
state or local law which has an environmental impact in the broadest sense. A "de
434) See supra pp. 63-65.
435) See supra note 377-82 and accompanying text.
436) See supra note 320-31 and accompanying text.
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minimus"-exception

should not be applied, as small violations of environmental law may

have enormous results,437 and the employee very often will lack the sophistication to
decide whether this is the case.
As anonymous reporting leads to a loss of effectiveness of the complaint,438 it should
not be possible.439 However, the government agency should be required to keep the
identity of the whistleblower confidential, unless he consents to disclosing it or the
440

disclosure is absolutely necessary for the prosecution of the wrongdoing.
employee's repo~g

When an

is protected by the statute, there is no point in telling the employer

who has reported and thus to enable him to illegal retaliation, or induce social rejection
within the finn. However, knowing that there is an anonymous "snitch" within the
organiazation may disturb the internal working climate considerably. Therefore, the
confidentiality duty should be limited to the broad whistleblowing covered by the statute
and should not extend to complaints in bad faith or without reasonable belief. If there is
doubt about that, the confidentiality duty should apply.

cc. Good Faith Allegations And Reasonable Belief
To prevent frivolous complaints, a statute should protect only whistleblowing in good
faith and should in addition require the reasonable belief that the reported conduct
constitutes a violation of environmental law.44 I The good faith requirement prevents
employees from utilizing whistleblowing for improper purposes, such as harassment of
their employers. The standard for reasonable belief should make sure that no totally

437) E.g. an oil spill.
438) See supra note 383-85 and accompanying text.
439) But see Feerick, supra note 340, at 592 (one of the best ways to encourage
whistleblowing is to ensure the anonymity").
440) See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
441) The standard of reasonable belief has been applied by the courts for the reverse case
when an employer discharged an employee protected by a just-cause provision for alleged
illegal conduct, see Lewis v. Magna Am. Corp., 472 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1972); Food
Fair Stores, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 314
A.2d 528 (1974).
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pointless allegations are made but should not raise the threshold for protection too high.
Therefore, the reasonableness of the belief should not be judged by the objective standard
of what an average employee in the situation would have considered reasonable. Then,
sophisticated employees who could know better would be protected, and the totally
ignorant not. It seems more appropriate to take the personal features of the concrete
whistleblower into account by asking whether for a person with his information,
education and intellectual capacities, the conduct reasonably appeared to be a violation of
Iaw. 442
The whistleb;ower should not be required to verify or investigate his allegations.443
The lack of technical or legal knowledge or of access to information will in many cases
prevent useful fmdings. Moreover, employees investigating their suspicions within the
fInn are likely to create considerable disruptions, and a requirement to investigate will
serve as a substantial deterrant to blow the whistle.

dd. Discriminatory Conduct And Motive
The statute should not only prohibit discharge, but also other adverse actions by the
employer. The broad interpretation the courts have given discriminatory conduct with
444

regard to the employment should be adopted.

For allocating the burden of proof, the

Mount Healthy standard should be applied.445
There should also be a cause of action against the employer when the whistleblower is
harassed by his fellow employees on the workplace as a result of his whistleblowing,
even when the employer did not instigate this harassment. This provision would make
sure that an employer does not try to circumvent the whistleblower protection by using
his employees and would secure at least a tolerable working environment for the

442)
443)
444)
445)

See
But
See
See

Malin, supra note 346, at 306.
see id. at 306.
supra note 86-91, 152-54,200-04 and accompanying text.
supra note 93-107 and accompanying text.
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whistleblower whose fellow employees are hostile. However, to mitigate this burden on
the employer, the ultimate burden of proof that the harassment occured and resulted from
the whistleblowing should rest on the employee.

b. Procedure And Remedies

aa. The Adequate Dispute Resolution Mechanism
In theory, there are three ways to resolve whistleblower claims: Through litigation,
through administrative proceedings, or through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
such as mediation or arbitration. As all of these models have their advantages and
drawbacks, litigation seems to be most appropriate for environmental whistleblowing.
Administrative proceedings seem to be the least desirable way. It is neither effective to
let each agency to which the report was made also handle the whistleblower protection
claim nor to grant this task to the environmental agencies which have jurisdiction. Besides
the fact that the whistleblower cases then would be scattered, with none of the agencies
developing expertise in handling them, many environmental agencies may be sympathetic
to their respective industIy, or may not be impartial, as whistleblowing implies that the
agency is not effective.446 Creating one state agency for all whistleblower claims 447
creates not only an addditionallayer of bureaucracy,448 but the potential problem that
expertise from other agencies, possibly federal or local ones, may be needed to resolve
the claim. Despite efforts, the goal of developing efficient interagency information
449

channels has not even been achieved on the federalleve1.

Finally, the existing time

limits in the procedural rules do not help to speed up the procedure, as they are usually

446) See Fidell, supra note 52, at 18-19 (1988); Joseph Grodin, Toward a Wrongful
Termination Statute for California, 42 HASTINGSLJ. 135, 151 (1990).
447) see Fidell, supra note 52, at 20-21; Boyle, supra note 127, at 828 (for federal level).
448) Hill, supra note 29, at 10.
449) See Fidell, supra note 52, at 20-21.
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not met, and the possibility of judicial review of agency decisions further delays a fmal
.
450
reso 1ution.

'

The generally quick, informal and inexpensive dispute resolution mechanisms of
mediation and arbitration 451 are not well suited for environmental whistleblowing cases
as well. Forced negotiations by mediation implies compromise, and in case of dismissal,
there is no room for it Either the discharge was legal, or it was retaliatory and the
452

employee gains reinstatement or darnages.

Arbitration is usually quick and

inexpensive because it does not require extensive discovery or careful handling of
evidence, nor does it involve too much concern for precedent and policy
considerations.453 However, exactly these advantages make arbitration not well suited
for the resolution of environmental whistleblower protection suits with its underlying
. 1·lcatlOns.
.
454
pu bli c po li cy unp
Therefore, despite the drawbacks of high expenses and overburdened courts which
delay suits,455 litigation provides for a fair and thorough resolution of whistleblower
claims. The high expenses mainly deter the employee from going to court. However,
they may be mitigated by the possibility of recovery of litigation expenses including
attorney's fees, and of punitive damages, which enable the employee to work with an
.
b . 456
attorney on a conungency aSlS.

450) See Grodin, supra note 446, at 15I.
451) See Grodin, supra note 446, at 15I.
452) Hill, supra note 29, at II.

453) [d.
454) [d.; compare Grodin, supra note 446, at 151-157 (raising constitutional objections

for California).
455) See Hill, supra note 29, at 8; Grodin, supra note 446, at 150 ("anyway").
456) See Grodin, supra note 446, at 150.
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bb. Exhaustion Of Administrative Proceedings Or Of Intracorporate Complaint
Procedures
Neither the requirement of prior exhausting administrative procedures nor of
458

intracorporate procedures contained in some statutes 457 should be adopted.

Both

restrain the employee's access to the public adjudicatory process and may delay the
459

prompt disposition of employee protection complaints.

Although such prior

proceedings may reduce the need of court involvement in some cases, the possibility of
judicial review may lead to a substantial lengthening of the whole process. Moreover,
administrative resolution of environmental whistleblower claims is not the most efficient
way.460 Mandating the exhaustion of intracorporate complaint mechanisms may provide
the employer arguably with an unfair opportunity for early discovery, possibly before the
. 461 F'm all y, pursumg
.. mtracorporate comp Iamt
.
emp Ioyee h as Ieg al representatton.
procedure, which might be dominated by the employer's representatives, may pose a
462

substantial psychological burden on the employee.

cc. Remedies
Recovery in whistleblower claims should not be restricted to equitable remedies,463
but should also allow for compensatory and punitive damages 464 and litigation expenses.
Reinstatement with back pay after a possibly nasty and emotional litigation generally
does not appear as desirable to an employee.465 In the comparable situation of reinstated

457) See supra note 210-15 and accompanying text.
458) Fidell, supra note 52, at 21-22 (arguing in this direction).

459) [d. at 22.
460) See supra pp. 84-85.
461) Fidell, supra note 52, at 22.
462) Compare Feerick, supra note 340, at 595 ("one of the most important changes

necessary to promote effective whistleblowing laws is the elimination of the notice
provision"); Fidell, supra note 52, at 22.
463) See supra note 216-226 and accompanying text.
464) See Grodin, supra note 446, at 160 (views public policy violations such as
whistleblowing as deserving punitive damages).
465) Dworkin & Near, supra note 8, at 248,262; Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 244.
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employees fired for attempts to bring a union into their firm, empirical research has
shown that most of them quit "voluntarily" after a while. Without the help of a union
supporting the employee and discouraging the employer from harassment, many
employees cannot stand the pressures of returning to the workplace. Reinstatement thus
has the ironic effect that despite lost litigation, the employer eventually gets his way
WI'th out

too muc h cost. 466

Compensatory damages as well as punitive damages may lead to high awards, thus
467

serving as a sub~tantial incentive for the employee.

Compensatory damages refund

the employee for the emotional and physical stress of being unemployed and pursuing a
lawsuit.468 Punitive damages provide a threat which does not fit into a cost-benefit
analysis on part of the employer, as the size of the award depends on how outrageous the
.. perceives th e con d uct. 469M oreover, pumttve
..
d amages all ow an emp 1oyee
Jury

10

minimize the cost risk by working with a capable attorney on a contingency basis. The
possibility of recovering "reasonable" attorney's fees may especially in complicated cases
not be sufficient.
On the other hand, an employer should be able to recover his litigation expenses when
470

the whistleblower protection claim was clearly frivolous.

Although such a provision

might potentially deter employees from bringing a valid claim,471 the employee's
attorney may counsel him appropriately.

c. Notification Requirement
The employer should be required to post the text of the statute and possibly a simple
explanation of its content on a place where all employees have access to it. This

466) Compare Malin, supra note 346, at 316-17; Grodin, supra nOle 446, at 158-59.
467) See Barnett, supra note 41, at 446; Hill, supra note 29, at 8.
468) Miceli & Near, supra note 6, at 244.
469) See Hill, supra note 29, at 8.

470) A provision resembling Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 could be integrated.
471) See Freerick, supra note 340, at 596.

86
requirement would not only inform the individual employee about his rights but would
also serve as a means to make employees and employers conscious of society's interest in
protecting environmental whistleblowing, and thus help to shape group nonns as well as
. tal attItu
. de tow ard reportIng.
. 472
SOCle

d. Statute Of Limitations
As discharges and other adverse personnel measures happen every day, and
considering the possibly high damages in a whistleblower action, the statute of limitations
should recognize the need of the employer for certainty by allowing him to close the book
after a certain time, but should a1low for enough time for the employee to get legal advice
and prepare a claim. As due to the notification requirement, the employee is aware of the
possibility of bringing a claim for discrimination, and legal counsel is readily available in
the United States, the statute of limitations should be short. Idea1ly, it should be
somewhere between 3 months 473 to 1 year after the a1leged discriminatory conduct
occurred.

e. Relationship To Other Laws
The statute should explicitly state that it is available besides possibly existing federal
remedies. The outlined statute is not preempted, as it is more generous than the federal
statutes and thus not in conflict with the purpose of federal environmental whistleblower
law. Its broader scope, especia1ly with regard to covered wrongdoing, damages, and
statute of limitations, will lead employees to seek recovery under the statute rather than
under federal law.
To foster unifonnity and thus certainty as to what law is applicable, the statute should
preclude common law remedies for whistleblowing. As it a1lows for punitive damages as

472) See supra note 366-68, 390-92 and accompanying text.
473) Compare Fidell, supra note 52, at 18 (not less than 180 days).
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well, the main advantage of a whistleblower tort action has disappeared. On the contrary,
allowing tort actions would circumvent the requirement of reasonable belief as well as the
shorter statute of limitations.
Finally, preclusion of tort claims for defamation by the employer or co-employees
need not to be covered.474 Liability for defamation requires false allegations and "actual
malice" on part of the whistleblower.475 This standard allows only recovery in cases
where the whistleblower either knows or has recklessly disregarded doubts about the
trUth of his statement. This kind of whistleblowing would not be protected under the
good faith and reasonable belief standard either. Therefore, and as such liability helps
deter cases of frivolous complaints in which neither the organization nor society at large
has an interest, the question of liability for defamation need not to be adressed.
However, false allegations can constitute a breach of the implied duties of obedience,
476
loyalty and confidentiality, or of an explicit confidentiality clause.
The statute should
make clear that whistleblowing within the scope of the statute does not constitute such a
breach.

474) See supra note 302-11 and accompanying text.
475) See supra note 282-86 and accompanying text.
476) See supra note 245-55 and accompanying text.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION
The shortcomings of the existing environmental whistleblower law call for rethinking
the way the legal system adresses the problem. Balancing the interests of the
organization, society and the whistleblower shows that whistleblowing regulation should
encourage external reporting to government authorities. Although both incentive and
disincentive models have the potential to alter whistleblower behavior, an evaluation of
the possible ways to reach increased external whistleblowing favors the removal of
disincentives for employee reporting. As the existing whistleblower law focuses on that
way, the approaches best suited to encourage external whistleblowing can be taken from
the existing variety of whistleblower protection and can be combined in a model state
statute. Enacting this statute will not only have the effect of increasing external
whistleblowing but will most likely increase the number of internal reports as well. Thus,
by remodeling existing state statutes and by adopting new ones, a large step toward a
better environment can be achieved.
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